July 25, 2020

Abstract

The July 2020 issue of Strategic Assessment focuses on the theme of Israeli foreign policy and national security. To complement the articles in this issue, we held a discussion with former senior figures from the Foreign Ministry and researchers on foreign policy. Our goal was to shed light on a number of issues relating to the status of the Foreign Ministry from a historical and contemporary perspective, the contribution of foreign policy to national security, and the challenges facing the Foreign Ministry in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis and the future. Participants were Ron Prosor, former Director General of the Foreign Ministry, Israeli Ambassador to the UK and to the UN; Dr. Alon Liel, former Director General of the Foreign Ministry, Israeli Ambassador to South Africa and to Turkey; Dr. Haim Koren, former Israeli Ambassador to Egypt and South Sudan; Dr. Nimrod Goren, head of Mitvim—the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; Leah Landman, head of the 2030 Diplomacy Program; and Adv. Yaniv Cohen, CEO of the Abba Eban Institute at the Interdisciplinary Center. This summary of the discussion presents the main insights raised by the participants, without attributing the words to a specific speaker, except in cases where we felt exact words were warranted.

September 16, 2020

Abstract

Security threats play an essential and influential role in Israeli discourse, and some claim that this encourages and strengthens the militaristic approach of Israeli society and its political and military echelons. In practice, however, Israel has demonstrated military restraint over the last decade. This ostensible contradiction is the focus of this article, which examines political, military, and civilian realms, as well as the political civil control over the IDF. Israeli society can certainly be defined as culturally militaristic, with military symbols embedded in the public sphere in ceremonies, language, and icons. Yet when it comes to political militarism vis-à-vis supporting, prioritizing, and legitimizing the use of military force in order to resolve political problems, the political echelon is cautious, accountable, and responsible with regard to use of military force; the military echelon serves as a restraining actor; and the Israeli public is sober and realistic as to the possibility of resolving political problems by using military force. Therefore, that political militarism is a pervasive policy or strategy in Israel today is at the very least questionable.

September 01, 2020

Abstract

In this study, five threat scenarios were examined. Three scenarios involve military threats, and they are the

formation of a regional military coalition against Israel; nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; and the collapse of Israeli defense systems due to a massive, combined precision-missile attack led by Iran and its proxies. The other two threat scenarios are diplomatic and social threats, and they are international isolation and the boycott of Israel; and the disintegration of Israeli society, leading to the loss of its social cohesion and its identity as a Jewish and democratic state. In each scenario, the study examined possible threat causes; accelerating and inhibiting factors; secondary threats that accompany the main threats; and security pillars for providing a comprehensive military, diplomatic, and economic response to the threat scenarios and preventing them from materializing.

September 21, 2020

Abstract

The year 2020 marks seventy years since UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), which serves Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, began operation. Since its establishment by virtue of the mandate given to it by the UN General Assembly, UNRWA has not succeeded in bringing about the true rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees and in reducing their number, which has risen from approximately 700,000 on the eve of the State of Israel’s establishment to over 5.5 million refugees in 2020. The impact of the regional upheaval on the Palestinian refugees, the stagnation of the political process between Israel and the Palestinians, the split in the Palestinian arena, the humanitarian distress in the Gaza Strip, the centrality of the refugee issue in the Palestinian narrative, and the American administration’s 2018 decision to stop funding UNRWA pose even more complex challenges for the agency. In light of the understanding of the need for changing the agency’s modes of operation and adapting them to the challenges of the current reality, and given that all attempts and recommendations to significantly reform the agency’s modes of operation over the years having been thwarted, this memorandum discusses UNRWA’s operational concept and functioning and presents four alternative models of operation, along with a methodology for analyzing the different alternatives.

November 22, 2019

Abstract

The regional upheaval, which began eight years ago, has left its mark on the Middle East and has entirely changed the logic underlying its structure. Alongside the spillover of intrastate conflicts from failed states, we are witnessing the growing phenomenon of non-state actors, mostly Jihadi terror organizations, alongside
intervention of external entities that escalates the intrastate confrontation and, as a result, the failed state becomes even weaker. These two interwoven processes eventually lead to the rapid undermining of regional stability and international order and has the potential to drag the entire system into a chaotic and bloody future. On the other hand, it might also be an opportunity to change the political order and system in such a way as to facilitate more stabilization of the region based on an alternative political model, one more suitable to the local political culture..

November 04, 2019

Abstract

In this article, we will focus on cognitive intelligence as a field in its own right whose importance has increasingly been recognized in recent years, as well as its interfaces with other fields that influence it and are affected by it. The article establishes a conceptual and theoretical foundation and aims to serve as a basis for developing methodologies and operating concepts within the intelligence community in the field of cognition, while relying on existing conceptualizations within the field. The article reveals the scope of the discussion and addresses the open questions, which will expand the knowledge base that the Israeli intelligence community has developed as a result of its practical experience in this field.

September 10, 2019

Abstract

Nonetheless, it is an important and impressive work that introduces readers to a vast array of topics connected to Israeli national security. Working within the limitations of volumes like these, the editors offer a

unique thematic structure and complex picture of the world that will chal- lenge the casual reader and the academic researcher alike. The long list of sources built over the book’s 27 chapters is compelling for anyone looking to expand their knowledge on this important and critically relevant topic. Despite the book’s shortcomings, it is undoubtedly an important, impres- sive, and useful handbook that deserves a place in the library of anyone seeking a deeper understanding of Israel’s national security challenges.

July 31, 2019

Abstract

Hybrid conflicts bring with them many varied situations in which the need to neutralize threats and ensure security on the one hand clashes with the need for restraint and moderation in the use of military force to achieve these goals on the other hand. In the many instances in which the IDF has had to operate under such tension and maintain its values in force application, it has often found itself at the center of social and political division, and without the backing of the political echelon. The question of civilian control of military force to achieve political goals becomes even sharper in the world of hybrid conflicts, highlighting the need to consider the way in which values influence the use of military force and to study the political echelon's involvement in defining the army’s values. In the military context, values serve as guiding principles for the use of force and open-fire orders, and have the capacity to influence the achievement of political goals and the area of political maneuvering. The article argues that in the world of hybrid conflicts, the political echelon – by means of mechanisms of civilian control – must have a say and be involved in value-related issues that influence how military force is used.

July 18, 2019

Abstract

“Academization of intelligence” is defined as the academic research, conceptualization, and teaching about the world of intelligence. Its goal is to study the field of intelligence’s essence, activities, and influence on the national security of the state and its decision-making processes. Policymakers and political leaders have recognized the increasingly significant role of intelligence in shaping policy and decision-making processes. These developments and concerns accelerated the academization of intelligence and gave the field its due attention and prominence. As the demand for intelligence practitioners increased, American and Western universities responded to the growing need for formulating academic programs and courses devoted to intelligence, which significantly accelerated the academization of intelligence. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are at the forefront of efforts to academize intelligence. In other Western countries, such as Spain, France, and Germany, the process of academicization has been slower and burdened by the darker roles played by the intelligence services at certain points in history.

May 05, 2019

תקציר

במאמר זה נתמקד במודיעין על התודעה כתחום העומד בפני עצמו וזוכה בשנים האחרונות להכרה הולכת ומתרחבת בחשיבותו, וכן בממשקים בינו ובין יתר המרחבים המשפיעים עליו ומושפעים ממנו. המאמר מניח תשתית מושגית ותיאורטית ונועד להוות מסד לפיתוח מתודולוגיות ותפיסות הפעלה בקהילת המודיעין בתחום התודעה, תוך הישענות על ההמשגות המופיעות בו. הוא מצביע על מרחבי הדיון ועל שאלות פתוחות, שעיסוק בהן ירחיב את בסיס הידע שברשות קהילת המודיעין הישראלית כתוצאה מהתנסותה המעשית בתחום זה.

April 25, 2019

Abstract
Seeking a coherent definition of national resilience, this paper conceptualizes the term National Resilience, based on an in-depth
interview with Lieutenant General (ret.) Moshe “Bogie” Ya’alon. Ya’alon argues that the components of national resistance are first and foremost leadership, trust in this leadership, faith in the righteousness of our way, shared destiny, and unity of purpose. Israeli society’s purpose ought to be linked to a shared destiny, to the life of a people that has returned to its land and is prepared to sacrifice for its national home. Therefore, it is necessary to have a leadership that will know to present these goals clearly and to say this explicitly. Today we are in a situation of sub-conventional war where the target of enemy attacks is not our military forces but our civilians. In recent years what was tested in all the military campaigns was society’s ability to remain steadfast. This situation requires the leadership to speak directly to the citizens about the cost of independence and to state clearly that the road is long and hard. Leadership which is based upon
public trust is a matter of critical importance. Therefore, it is forbidden for the leadership to act under a cloud of doubt as to the purity of its character.

April 16, 2019

Abstract

This article deals with the increasing importance of human terrain and cultural intelligence in the contemporary urban warfare and elaborates on the interfaces between human terrain and cultural intelligence. After defining the concepts and explaining their rationales and necessity we describe the modern historical development of both, emphasizing the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and
Syria, and briefly mentioning on the Israeli experience in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Using the theoretical foundations of both concepts enables us to add another analytical and theoretical layer to the existing literature. Our main claim is that acquiring an in-depth understanding of the local culture is an
essential condition for ensuring the relevance of a military mission. Cultural understanding and knowledge are an outcomes of cultural intelligence which obtained by the Human Terrain System that provide structural and operational means for military mission and force participates in contemporary hybrid and urban warfare.

October 26, 2018

Abstract

The process of institutionalization of non-state actors is reflected in the development of their ability to govern an area and population. This ability demands political pragmatism and responsible, restrained conduct regarding the use of terror as a political tool. The processes that Hamas has undergone since it seized control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, as seen in the structural tension between its role as a political, governing entity and the preservation of its founding ethos as a resistance movement dedicated to the armed struggle against Israel, form an interesting and challenging subject. Thus with Hamas as a case study, the question examined here is how the process of political institutionalization of non-state actors (in the sense of their becoming an element of government) affects their continued use of violence and armed methods, and whether the use of violence impedes or arrests the process. In this context, the essay will examine Israel’s potential influence on some of the variables involved.

September 05, 2018

Abstract

On August 31, 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States will cease funding UNRWA, citing the organization’s operational-business model as unsustainable, given its "endlessly and exponentially expanding community of entitled beneficiaries." This decision is no less than historic. Although the Palestinians view it as a serious blow, if it is presented as a necessary step on the path to Palestinian statehood, it has the potential to harbor long term, positive implications. While Israel should certainly prepare for negative scenarios that such a policy move may generate in the near term, it is unwise to cling to the current paradigm that distances the Palestinian leadership's pragmatic and ethical responsibility for rehabilitating and resettling Palestinian refugees within the Palestinian territories. With staunch Israeli, American, and international incentives and policy initiatives, the US decision to cease funding UNRWA can serve as a wake-up call to the Palestinian leadership and potentially inject new life into the Israeli-Palestinian process.

July 04, 2018

This document presents the findings of a research project of the Institute of National Security Studies, whose objective was to analyze the security and strategic threats and challenges to Israel according to a list of plausible scenarios in the Palestinian arena (including the continuation of the current regime) and present the possible Israeli responses to the challenges and threats, while elaborating on the limitations and implications of the response, repercussions of the challenges, and threats to the feasibility of advancing toward a reality of two states for two peoples.
The project identified the security threats and the responses and analyzed and presented the implications according to six different scenarios in the Palestinian arena. The team developed a number of key insights relating to the broad security context and the links between the security aspects and the political, religious, social, and economic aspects of Israel’s strategic environment. The research validates some of the insights that predate this research study, weakens, or refutes other insights, and helps develop valuable new insights..

March 01, 2018

Abstract

After seven years of upheavals, the Arab world is immensely changed, with many of its members in an accelerated process of state failure. While it would be premature to write off the Middle Eastern nationstate
system, key states including Syria and Iraq as well as Libya and Yemen are unlikely to retain their past structures, primarily because none of them has developed a coherent national identity and all suffer from deep sociopolitical schisms. Each state's only chance of survival is probably either within a loose federation where ethnic and religious minorities and tribes enjoy broad autonomy, or as smaller and more coherent states that conform more closely to their demographic, religious, and sociopolitical components.
Iraq, for example, could be divided into three states—Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish—while Sy ria could be split into Alawite, Sunni, and Kurdish states.
Returning to Netanyahu's cautionary note, the Arab upheavals underscore the necessity of a paradigm
change if the Palestinian state-building is to come to successful fruition rather than culminate in an all-toofamiliar failed state. This requires reconstructing society and state institutions in a bottom-up process that ensures broad legitimacy via free sociopolitical participation, redistribution of governing assets and political power, and, above all, exclusive state control of the means of violence. Whether the current Palestinian leadership can rise to this historic challenge remains to be seen..

February 14, 2018

Abstract

After seven years of upheavals, the Arab world is immensely changed, with many of its members in an accelerated process of state failure. While it would be premature to write off the Middle Eastern nationstate system, key states including Syria and Iraq as well as Libya and Yemen are unlikely to retain their past structures, primarily because none of them has developed a coherent national identity and all suffer from deep sociopolitical schisms. Each state's only chance of survival is probably either within a loose federation where ethnic and religious minorities and tribes enjoy broad autonomy, or as smaller and more coherent states that conform more closely to their demographic, religious, and sociopolitical components.
Iraq, for example, could be divided into three states—Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish—while Sy ria could be split into Alawite, Sunni, and Kurdish states.
Returning to Netanyahu's cautionary note, the Arab upheavals underscore the necessity of a paradigm change if the Palestinian state-building is to come to successful fruition rather than culminate in an all toofamiliar failed state. This requires reconstructing society and state institutions in a bottom-up process that ensures broad legitimacy via free sociopolitical participation, redistribution of governing assets and
political power, and, above all, exclusive state control of the means of violence. Whether the current Palestinian leadership can rise to this historic challenge remains to be seen.

February 05, 2018

מתוך פרק המבוא לספר

אין חולק לגבי היותה של מלחמת ששת הימים אירוע מכונן בתולדות מדינת ישראל והמזרח התיכון כולו. יעידו על כך האירועים האקדמיים, הציבוריים והפוליטיים הרבים שנערכו לציון חמישים שנה למלחמה. גם במכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי הוקדשה חשיבה ונכתבו מחקרים אודות השלכותיה המגוונות של המלחמה. היבטים שונים שלה ושל תוצאותיה קִצרות וארוכות הטווח נדונו בהרחבה במאמרים המאוגדים בקובץ זה. בנוסף, המכון ערך יום עיון מרובה דוברים ומשתתפים, בשיתוף עם יד בן־צבי, שבו הוצגו אחדים מהמאמרים הכלולים בקובץ. מדובר, אם כן, בתרומה של המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי לשיח הציבורי שהתעורר במלאת חמישים שנה למלחמה, שבמסגרתו בולטת נטייה להדגיש את שני קצות ההתייחסות אליה ואל משמעויותיה: לצד הערכות סופרלטיביות לגבי המלחמה עצמה ותוצאותיה המדיניות והטריטוריאליות המידיות, נשמעת גם ביקורת על התנהלותן של ההנהגות המדינית והצבאית של ישראל טרם המלחמה ובמהלכה, וכן ביחס לתוצאותיה והשלכותיה בעשורים הבאים.

מדינת ישראל והחברה הישראלית שינו את פניהן ללא הכר לאחר מלחמת ששת הימים. תוצאות המלחמה לא זו בלבד שהרחיבו פי שלושה את השטח שבשליטת ישראל והעצימו את מעמדו של צה"ל בעיני עצמו, בעיני החברה הישראלית ובעיני הקהילה הבינלאומית, אלא גם הגבירו באחת את תחושת הביטחון של הציבור בישראל ואת ביטחונם העצמי של הנהגתה וצבאה, עד כדי אופוריה ושיכרון כוח. אלא שלצד ההישגים הטריטוריאליים ושדרוג מעמדה האזורי והבינלאומי של ישראל, תוצאות המלחמה יצרו מחלוקת פוליטית עמוקה בחברה הישראלית. בנוסף לכך, הן קיבעו את החשיבה הצבאית והמדינית למשך שנים ארוכות. לצד זאת חל שינוי בדפוסי פעילותו של צה"ל: לאחר המלחמה הוא נאלץ להשקיע משאבים רבים במשימות שיטור ברצועת עזה וביהודה ושומרון. באותן שנים נרשמה גם התפתחות מואצת של התנועה הלאומית הפלסטינית. עם הזמן תורגמה התפתחות זו להגברת הלחץ הבינלאומי על ישראל לרכך את התנגדותה לתביעות הלאומיות הפלסטיניות. מדינת ישראל הלכה ונתפסה על ידי גורמים רבים בזירה הבינלאומית ככוח כובש — למעֵין "דוד שהפך לגוליית".

פרספקטיבה היסטורית מאפשרת בחינה ביקורתית ומאוזנת עד כמה שניתן של ההתרחשויות ותוצאותיהן, אלא שזו עלולה לתעתע. הנטייה לנכס מגמות והתפתחויות שונות למלחמת ששת הימים ולתוצאותיה עלולה להתברר כבעייתית, שכן לא מן הנמנע שחלק מההתפתחויות המיוחסות לה היו נוצרות גם בהקשרים היסטוריים אחרים. יחד עם זאת, נראה שמלחמה זו עיצבה ארבע זירות עיקריות והשפיעה על התפתחויות שנרשמו בהן בשנים הבאות: הזירה הפנים־ישראלית; הזירה הישראלית־פלסטינית; הזירה האזורית במזרח התיכון; הזירה הבינלאומית בהקשרה לישראל. זירות אלו משיקות זו לזו ומשפיעות האחת על השנייה. הזיקות בין הזירות באות לידי ביטוי ברבים מהמאמרים בקובץ זה, שחולקו לשלושה שערים נושאיים: מדיני־ביטחוני, צבאי ויחסי חברה־צבא בישראל.

בהקדמה זו נדונים נושאים שביטוייהם השונים שלובים ברבים ממאמרי הקובץ, על שלושת השערים המרכיבים אותו. נושאים אלה הם האתגר הצבאי־ביטחוני הניצב בפני ישראל, כפי שהתפתח מאז מלחמת ששת הימים ועל רקע תוצאותיה המדיניות והטריטוריאליות; סוגיית הסכסוך הישראלי־פלסטיני, שתוצאות המלחמה העלו אותה על סדר היום האזורי והבינלאומי וגם הציפו אותה למרכז השיח בחברה הישראלית עצמה; שאלות לגבי היחסים בין הדרג האזרחי־מדיני ובין הדרג הצבאי, שעלו בעקבות המלחמה ונותרו על הפרק בעשורים הבאים.

February 07, 2018

תקציר
 שאותו מנסה הנשיא עבאס P+5 למרות היעדר הסבירות להחלפתה של ארצות הברית על ידי מנגנון בסגנון לכפות על התהליך המדיני, דבקה ההנהגה הפלסטינית, בשלב זה, במדיניות הלעומתית. הדבקות הפלסטינית בקו זה עלולה לגבות מחיר כלכלי כבד מהרשות הפלסטינית בשל הקושי שיהיה לאיחוד האירופי להשלים את הקיצוץ האמריקני בסיוע לפלסטינים, בעיקר אם הממשל האמריקני ישית את הקיצוץ גם על תקציב הסיוע לרשות הפלסטינית בעקבות חוק טיילור-פורס וכתגובה להתייחסות עבאס לנשיא ארצות הברית ולממשל, ולהחלטה לנתק את ארצות הברית מתפקיד ההובלה של התהליך ולהחרמת סגן הנשיא פנס.

February 05, 2018

תקציר

על רקע הקיפאון בתהליך השלום והמשבר החריף ביחסי ארה"ב והרשות הפלסטינית, מאז שנשיא ארה"ב דונלד טראמפ הצהיר על ההכרה בירושלים כבירת ישראל בראשית דצמבר 2017, בכירים ברשות הפלסטינית, בהם היו"ר מחמוד עבאס ומזכ"ל הוועד הפועל של אש"ף צאאב עריקאת, הצהירו כי הפלסטינים עשויים לסגת מפתרון שתי המדינות ולחתור לפתרון של מדינה אחת, שתעניק שוויון זכויות מלא לכלל אזרחיה. הצהרות אלו יכולות להתפרש כצעד טקטי שתכליתו הפעלת לחץ על ישראל, ארה"ב והקהילה הבינלאומית לאשרור עיקרון שתי המדינות, לצד ניסיון לשקם את הלגיטימציה הנשחקת של ההנהגה הפלסטינית בקרב הציבור הפלסטיני. לחלופין, ניתן לפרש את ההצהרות, אשר לוו בהכרזה לפיה הפלסטינים אינם מקבלים עוד את ארה"ב כמתווכת בתהליך המדיני, כניסיון התחמקות מהתמודדות עם תכנית השלום עליה צפוי להכריז טראמפ במהלך המחצית הראשונה של שנת 2018.

January 29, 2018

The buildup of force relies on an understanding of the asymmetry between Hamas and Israel and the organization’s effort to compensate for its military inferiority. Hamas seeks to develop capabilities that will attack Israel’s weak points and shape rules of the game that will keep Israel from taking advantage of its military edge as the organization targets Israel’s technological superiority, modern economy, and the desire of its citizens for a high quality of life. Consequently, Hamas has invested efforts to develop high trajectory weaponry and an air and naval force. It seeks to expand its underground range by digging attack tunnels under the Gaza Strip border with Israel and command and control tunnels that will enable it to disrupt ordinary life in Israel, damage essential infrastructure, lengthen the conflict, and drag Israel into a military response that will expose it to international pressure and domestic criticism.

January 29, 2018

תקציר

בניין הכוח הצבאי של חמאס מושתת על הבנת המציאות הא־סימטרית בינו לבין ישראל ועל מאמץ לחפות על נחיתותו הצבאית. חמאס מבקש לפתח יכולות שיפגעו בנקודות התורפה של ישראל ולעצב כללי משחק שלא יאפשרו לה למצות את יתרונה הצבאי, ויגרמו לכך שיתרונותיה הטכנולוגיים, הכלכלה המודרנית שלה ושאיפת אזרחיה לאיכות חיים ייעשו פגיעים. לכן משקיע חמאס מאמץ בפיתוח נשק תלול מסלול, כוח אווירי וכוח ימי, וכן בהרחבת התווך התת־קרקעי באמצעות חפירת מנהרות התקפיות מתחת לגבול הרצועה עם ישראל, ומנהרות פיקוד ושליטה בשטח הרצועה שיאפשרו לשבש את שגרת החיים בישראל, לפגוע בתשתיות חיוניות, לכפות עליה משכי לחימה ארוכים ולגרור אותה לתגובה צבאית שתחשוף אותה ללחצים בינלאומיים ולביקורת מבית.

January 28, 2018

היחלשות "המדינה האסלאמית" והווקום אליו נכנסו איראן וגרורותיה, מובילים את ישראל לחזק את מרכיב האילוץ באסטרטגיית הכפייה. אסטרטגיית הכפייה באה לידי ביטוי באמצעות שני מרכיבים: הרתעה ואילוץ, הקשורים בהתאמה להגנה ולהתקפה בכל הנוגע למטרות (שינוי הסטטוס־קוו או שמירתו()ולתזמון

January 03, 2018

Abstract

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This chapter focuses on trends in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, exploring in particular developments with the potential to help thaw the deadlock and policy recommendations to facilitate realization of this potential. Proposed measures can both help remove obstacles to upgraded relations between Israel and pragmatic Arab countries, and encourage the expansion of these relations to the public stage.

December 31, 2017

תקציר

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מלחמת ששת הימים, שפרצה בבוקר ה־ 5 ביוני 1967 , הייתה אירוע מכונן אשר שינה את פניה של מדינת ישראל ובמידה רבה את המזרח התיכון כולו. ישראל שבטרם המלחמה הייתה נתונת תחת איום קיומי ובמהלך שישה ימים הצליח צה"ל להסירו, להשיג הכרעה צבאית ניצחת ולמצב את ישראל ככוח משמעותי במרחב. אולם, הניצחון טמן בחובו גם מורכבויות חדשות. חמישים שנים לאחר המלחמה, חלק מהשלכותיה נותרו דילמות כבדות משקל, המחייבות התייחסות מצדם של הציבור הישראלי ומוסדות המדינה. בחלוף חמישים שנה מאז המלחמה, יש צורך לבחון את האירועים הקשורים בה ישירות ואת השלכותיה ארוכות הטווח בהסתכלות רחבה ושקולה יותר מאשר בתקופה שמיד לאחריה. למידת העבר והפקת תובנות מהמלחמה ותוצאותיה גם מאפשרות לנתח את האתגרים הביטחוניים והמדיניים המורכבים הניצבים לפתחה של מדינת ישראל בעת הנוכחית וגם להעריך את אלה הגלומים בתרחישים עתידיים. במלאות 50 שנה למלחמה בחר המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי לפרסם קובץ מאמרים המוקדש למלחמה ולקחיה. קובץ זה כולל מאמרים מפרי עטם של חוקרים מהמכון ומחוצה לו. המאמרים עצמם מוקדשים לבחינת מגוון רחב של סוגיות, מהתחום המדיני, הצבאי וכן מתחום יחסי צבא-חברה בישראל. מאמרים אלה, כשהם מקובצים יחדיו, מציגים תמונה מקיפה ומעמיקה של מלחמת ששת הימים, תוצאותיה והשלכותיה.

December 31, 2017

תקציר

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,פרק זה יתמקד במגמות בזירה הישראלית־פלסטינית, בהתפתחויות שגלום בהן פוטנציאל להפשרת הקיפאון בזירה זו ובהמלצות למדיניות שתסייע לממש פוטנציאל זה, וכך גם יתאפשר להסיר מן הדרך מכשולים לשדרוג הקשרים בין ישראל למדינות ערביות פרגמטיות, ולהעבירם לשלב הפומבי והרחב יותר של היחסים.

September 28, 2017

Abstract

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This article seeks to examine and explain the challenge of the current delegitimization campaign (with BDS as its central and prominent characteristic) by comparing it to similar challenges Israel has faced in the past. While delegitimization in its current form is more complex and welldeveloped than previous challenges, the underlying rationale is similar and involves three levels: Israel’s right to exist as a nation-state, Israel’s right
to self-defense, and Israel’s right to explain its actions. On the first level, Israel’s opponents make great efforts to deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people by presenting it as a colonialist project born from the original injustice done to the native Palestinian population. The second level includes the efforts of Israel’s opponents to deny its right to defend itself against terrorism by condemning its responses as disproportionate, contrary to international law, and in blatant violation of basic Palestinian human rights. Finally, the third level constitutes the efforts made to deny Israel’s right to explain its actions either by boycotting and removing Israel from international forums or by assisting the media whose coverage of Israel is biased for various reasons and prefers not to emphasize or at times even present the Israeli position.

September 28, 2017

Abstract

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This article discusses the main system-wide tasks of the intelligence community regarding the delegitimization challenge, analyzes relevant tensions, difficulties, and problems, and highlights the unique issues that the intelligence community must address. Areas where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which is responsible for advocacy efforts, including the positive branding of Israel – has a comparative advantage are beyond the scope of this article. We address a number of central questions: is delegitimization, in fact, an intelligence challenge? What is the essence of this challenge, and what is its unique nature? How should the intelligence community deal with the intelligence challenge (with an emphasis on ethical issues)?
What are the barriers and obstacles facing the intelligence community in dealing with the challenge, and how should it handle them? How should the intelligence community relate to civilian bodies involved in the struggle against delegitimization?

August 09, 2017

תקציר

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במלאות 50 שנים למלחמה בחר המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי לפרסם קובץ מאמרים המוקדש למלחמה ולקחיה. קובץ זה כולל מאמרים מפרי עטם של חוקרים מהמכון ומחוצה לו. המאמרים עצמם מוקדשים לבחינת מגוון רחב של סוגיות, מהתחום המדיני, הצבאי וכן מתחום יחסי צבא-חברה בישראל. מאמרים אלה, כשהם מקובצים יחדיו, מציגים תמונה מקיפה ומעמיקה של מלחמת ששת הימים, תוצאותיה והשלכותיה. 

August 27, 2017

Abstract

This book sets out the major social scientific approaches to the study of Special Operations Forces. Despite consistent downsizing, over the past two decades the armed forces of the industrial democracies have seen a huge growth in Special Operations Forces (SOF). Through increasing numbers of personnel and more frequent deployments, SOF units have wielded considerable influence in conflicts around the world, with senior SOF officers having led major strategic operations. This increased presence and unprecedented expansion for SOF is largely a result of the ‘new’ kinds of conflicts that have emerged in the 21st century. At the same time, even with this high profile in the military, policy and media and popular cultural arenas, there is relatively little social scientific research on SOF. This volume aims to fill this gap by providing a series of studies and analyses of SOF across the globe, since the end of World War II. Analysing SOF at the micro, mezzo and macro levels provides broad and diverse insights. Moreover, the volume deals with new issues raised by the use of such forces that include emerging modes of civilian control, innovative organizational forms and the special psychological characteristics necessitated by SOF operatives. It concludes with a discussion of a question which continues to be debated in today’s militaries: what makes SOF ‘special’? Filling a clear gap in the literature, this book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, civilmilitary
relations, irregular warfare, security studies, and International Relations.

July 01, 2017

Abstract

The failed state phenomenon is not new to the Arab world, having existed there well before the current regional upheaval. However, since the upheaval, states that were already in various stages of failure have declined further. Furthermore, the turmoil has challenged the geopolitical logic that long structured the Arab world, namely, states defined according to the territorial nation-state model, with clear borders and an authoritative central government. The weakness of the central governments has led to the expansion of ungoverned peripheries and the blurring of borders, which in turn has enabled jihadist organizations and foreign elements to penetrate state territory and create military and political bases of operation, thereby challenging central governments and systematically undermining state structures. The failed states are thus not simply a local problem, but constitute a global challenge due to the instability they export to other areas and the regional and international confrontations they invite. In recent decades, the West has tried to deal with the failed state phenomenon by means of humanitarian intervention and reconstruction missions, but in most cases these efforts have failed. The international community has found it difficult to reach a consensus regarding determined intervention that will be based on a broad coalition and enjoy the support of the superpowers and the UN Security Council. The result is war and human tragedy on a scale not seen in the Middle East for centuries.
The Arab World on the Road to State Failure examines the causes and characteristics of the failed state in the Middle East and its spread throughout the region, and evaluates the implications of the phenomenon for Israel, as well as for the regional and international arenas.

May 31, 2017

Abstract

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This article describes and defines the concept of “human terrain” that developed in the American military following its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq and elaborates on the reasons that led to its development. It focuses on the theoretical foundations and on the correlations between human terrain, cultural intelligence, and intercultural competence, all against the backdrop of the American and Israeli experiences in different theaters of confrontation.
Acquiring an in-depth understanding of the local culture is an essential condition for ensuring the relevance of a military mission. Cultural intelligence as a means of correlating the cultural knowledge obtained by the Human Terrain System with the intelligence necessary for carrying out the military mission is also crucial. Recognizing the importance of cultural intelligence led the American military to develop its Human Terrain System, which is composed of professional teams of social scientists who are embedded in forces at various
levels and whose role is to help the forces in the combat theaters gain an understanding of the culture and the society. Commanders and team members who took part in the program widely agreed that the Human Terrain System contributes to the relevance and success of the military mission; alongside the importance attributed to the system, however, its operation also sparked criticism, both in military and academic circles. Despite the methodological, operational, and organizational developments of the Human Terrain System in the American context, gaps still exist, and in many cases, the deliverables are inadequate. Gaps in knowledge of human terrain and its assimilation in the combat doctrine and in the intelligence methodology also exist among the security and intelligence agencies in Israel.

February 05, 2017

Abstract

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In our today international system, we cannot disconnect geographical and political dimensions any longer; the local cannot be disconnected from the regional and international. The international order is affected by local and distant disorders and chaotic situations, the atrocities conducted by ISIS in Syria and Iraq or the Somali pirates’ raids in the Red Sea are like the "Butterfly Effect" that begins in distant areas and ends with a tornado storm in Europe, America and East Asia. The international order of today is threatened by a spectrum
of security threats as well as by migrations flow that begins in the turbulent Middle East and undermines European countries’ internal and societal order and endangers the fragile bond of the EU as such. These trends evoke a "Giants struggle" between Russia and the West (USA and its Western allies) begins in Syria and ends in Ukraine. Is it a common denominator for all these threats? Is there one major generator for them?

February 27, 2017

Abstract

Despite the vast resources poured by the international community into the construction of Palestinian institutions, the PA has failed to build and maintain the infrastructures required for the establishment of a vital, democratic and functioning state. By most common parameters, the PA is a failed entity. Taking into account this experience and the consequences of the last six years of Arab upheavals, characterized by the increasing phenomenon of failed states, there is a need for a paradigm shift that will increase the likelihood of a functioning Palestinian state after a peace agreement with Israel is signed and reduce the risk of its being a failed state that would pose a complex, dangerous challenge for Israel and the neighbouring Arab states.

April 21, 2016

Abstract

Jihadist terror is a multidimensional challenge that compels unique difficulties on compatibility between the military campaign and the political goal. Compatibility between military campaigns and political goal requires a deeper understanding about the Jihadi terrorism phenomenon that could be achieved by a strategic and diagnostic learning process. Such learning requires certain characteristics, which enable the creation of open discourse. This article introduced definitions of closed and open discourse, characterized the required conditions for creating open discourse, and explained the linkage between strategic learning and open discourse. This article aims to add another theoretical layer to Rebecca Schiff’s ‘‘targeted partnership’’concept by elaborating on the essence of the encounter and discourse between the political and the military echelons in the context of terrorism in the Middle East, using examples from the American and Israeli experience. The concepts of ‘‘Discourse Space’’ and ‘‘Diagnostic Learning’’ are corresponding with Schiff’s concept and accomplish it.

Abstract

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This article surveys the large number of theaters and the differences between the enemies in Israel’s first circle of conflict. The analysis highlights the uniqueness of the various theaters in which the IDF operates, and stresses that the diversity of the challenges in the respective spheres requires rethinking the adapted response patterns. A concept that gives preference to response formulation and force buildup tailored to the specific needs of the various theaters (e.g., the West Bank; borders with the countries having a peace treaty with Israel), combined with the IDF’s multi-purpose forces, can help improve routine security, while at the same time free up resources to improve the readiness of other forces for the next war.

December 31, 2016

Abstract

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Jointness—a concept popular  in recent decades  in military,  intelligence, and civilian systems—represents a change in the way organizations function in a complex and challenging environment,  which is characterized by a networked structure, or multiple  connections among various entities. The most striking difference  between cooperation and  jointness  is the process of  fusion,  which is typical of jointness. While cooperation preserves distinct  organizational settings, authority, and areas of responsibility, in  jointness we see new organizational formats, which represent a  synergy that is greater than the sum of all the existing capabilities.
This essay focuses on jointness in intelligence. New ways of  thinking over the past years have led to the breakdown of the  compartmentalizing of intelligence organizations and have given  rise to models of jointness within intelligence organizations,  military forces, and civilian entities so that they can carry out  complex missions. This essay surveys the theoretical and practical development of the concept of jointness and presents four archetypes of jointness, based on several Israeli and American case histories. These case histories indicate that jointness has not always been applied accurately. The success of jointness depends upon several essential components that may be defined as its ecology. The most prominent is organizational freedom, which provides the space where it is possible and, indeed, recommended to provide autonomy to various working echelons; this autonomy allows for flexibility andcreativity even if it deviates from familiar modes of action.

Abstract

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Relations between the military and political echelons in Israel are complex and multifaceted, both in theory and in practice. The problems resulting from the interface between the two have at times resulted in ineffective military deployment or a crisis of expectations. Moreover, as the positions of the political echelon are never unanimous, its directives to the military have not always been aligned with the government’s position, and sometimes even have been nebulous.

In August 2015, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released a document entitled the “IDF Strategy” directly addressing the issue. Signed by the chief of staff, the document is notable in part for its proposal to adjust the discourse between the military and political echelons as well as to clarify the role of the chief of staff and his functional autonomy. In this document, the chief of staff suggests to the political echelon how it should formulate directives to the military so that military action will match the political objective in question, and thereby prevent a crisis of expectations. According to the document, the IDF sees its role of achieving “victory,” which does not necessarily mean defeating the enemy; the political echelon together with the chief of staff must define the concept of victory before the military is deployed. The publication of the “IDF Strategy,” unprecedented in Israel’s civil-military relations, alsohighlights the chief of staff’s sensitivity to Israeli public opinion.

Abstract

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In the debate about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, demography often figures center stage. Many of the supporters of the two-state solution have concluded that the demographic reality is working against Israel, such that the country is liable to lose its Jewish majority in the western land of Israel and hence its Jewish democratic character, or have the one-state solution imposed on it, which would spell the end of the Zionist vision. Those who oppose the two-state solution and/or those who see no urgency in resolving the conflict cite a different demographic picture that points to a growing Jewish majority in the next few decades, even in the absence of a division of the land. This essay examines the importance of demography in Israel’s overall strategic considerations. After reviewing the competing schools of thought, it concludes that despite the importance of the demographic factor, changes in demographics – in either direction – do not fundamentally change either Israel’s essential strategic position or the motivation of those seeking to delegitimize it.

Abstract

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The Israeli expectation was that given the regional challenges and turbulence, and the collective sense of Salafist jihadism as a severe global threat, the State of Israel, the only functioning democracy in the Middle East and an element on the frontlines of the battle against radical Islam and terrorism, would gain international stature. Many are therefore surprised that the international delegitimization of Israel has continued to increase in scope and intensity, influencing a wide range of audiences, opinion makers, and intellectual circles. This growing delegitimization, characterized by a profound, fundamental hostility to Israel, could exacerbate Israel’s standing in the international arena, negatively affect its political and military freedom of action, and perhaps even damage its economy. Therefore, the topic is relevant to the country’s national security and requires a systemic response.

Abstract

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The Middle East is now entering its fifth year of tempest that began as a protest by young citizens and liberal groupings seeking to rid themselves of the oppressive regimes in their countries, with the great expectation of an “Arab Spring” of freedom and democracy. This Arab Spring, however, quickly evolved into an Arab upheaval that served to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood and intensify disintegration of the present regional order based on recognised nation-states and international boundaries. In so doing, it has strengthened and facilitated the troubling spread of radical Islamic forces that are currently challenging the regional and world order and seeking to establish a new one.

Absract

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The term, ‘Islamic terrorism’, refers to terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic Jihad Organizations who wish to replace the nation-state based regional and world order and its currently accepted borders with the unitary Islamic state. Beginning, in the Levant, they wish to expand throughout the Middle East, then Europe and farther afield. Therefore, the spread of Islamic terror through the Middle East destabilizes the moderate Arab states and the Western Democracies currently fighting it.

To achieve political goals, strategy must achieve an optimal matching of the military effort to them. However, Islamic terrorism poses a novel challenge that disrupts the ability of Western Statesmen and Military Commanders to design a coherent and relevant grand-strategy because of the complexity of the phenomenon; its intellectual and cultural riddle is as yet not sufficiently comprehensible to them. Thus, statesmen are struggling to define political goals commensurate with the challenge and the commanders are struggling to define appropriate military action that will achieve those goals.[i] The resulting maladjustment between the two can lead to a crisis of expectations and then to a crisis of confidence between the political leadership and the military leadership.

The complexity of the Islamist terrorist challenge[ii] requires both the military and the statesmen to conduct complex learning and diagnostic processes to properly interpret the operational environment, analyze the relevance of political goals and military courses of action and adjust them accordingly to design a strategy. Ensuring such a learning process requires a distinct discourse space,[iii] an ‘Open Discourse Space’ that removes the hierarchic boundaries between statesmen and commanders, thus creating an intellectual partnership.

The copious existing literature on learning discusses individual learning, organizational learning and the specific learning methods of a military organization, but does not sufficiently discuss learning processes joining hierarchic levels. This learning across hierarchic boundaries is unique in that it is not individual, nor organizational, nor military.

Another problem is the limited understanding of the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. Despite its unique characteristics vis-à-vis other forms of terrorism and the fact that it has become a major challenge to regional and global stability and to the industrialized democracies, it is still an unsolved phenomenon. An important testimony to the extent of this gap and its strategic ramifications can be found in the comprehensive RAND study of the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[iv] After 13 years of war, the West has not yet developed and effective strategy to terminally defeat Islamic terrorism.

The concept of a Discourse Space joining statesmen and commanders can help to bridge these gaps. This article develops the original concept[v] by characterizing two types of Discourse Space (open and closed), identifying the correlation between strategic learning and the Open Discourse Space and identifying the conditions required to create it.

Israel has been fighting terror attacks since its establishment and over the past two decades it too has been fighting Islamic terrorism. Therefore, Israel’s experience can be used as a unique case study for studying this subject.

This article will attempt to answer three main questions:

1. How does Islamic terror challenge the ability of the statesman and the commander to identify the strategy best suited to achieve the political goal?

2. What type of discourse between the levels can ensure the greatest compatibility between the strategy and the political goal?

3. What are the conditions for creating the relevant Discourse Space and what are the barriers limiting its creation?

Abstract

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While failing and weak states are not new to the Middle East, the problem assumed a new dimension with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. During the years of the Oslo process, extensive efforts and resources were invested in promoting the political process so as to encourage the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, too little effort was put into ensuring the foundation for the establishment of a functional Palestinian state in the post-peace agreement period. Now, at this point, the Palestinian case requires an unflinching, honest look at 22 years of a political process in which the Palestinians failed to build a functioning state entity. The two semi-state Palestinian entities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are experiencing a dangerous process of state failure, and the international community is helpless in stopping it. It seems that without an organized, persistent, painstaking, and responsible state building process in which Israel plays an important part, there is no real hope for the development of these entities into functioning states, whether each on its own or together as one Palestinian state.

Abstract

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The events that erupted in Jerusalem during the Jewish holidays in the fall of 2015, reflecting what Palestinians feared were Israeli intentions to change the status quo on the Temple Mount, spilled over into Israel, to the border area with the Gaza Strip, and into the West Bank. Palestinian usage of terms related to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount – such as the al-Aqsa or al-Quds Intifada – strengthened the prevailing sense that the religious dimension was the major motif behind the recent escalation and “knife terrorism.” Indeed, most of the stabbing assailants, whose actions have taken the form of “self-sacrifice attacks” (in reference to the the high likelihood of their being killed), attribute their decisions to stab and murder Jews to Israeli conduct at the al-Aqsa compound and the blatant offense to the religious symbol that holds such great importance for Muslims.

Abstract

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Three rounds of violence between Israel and Hamas since 2008 have not resulted in any change to the fundamental essence of the conflict. Israel is trapped in an asymmetrical conflict with increasingly intense violence, a reality in which Hamas manages to prove the “Paradox of Power”: Israel’s military strength becomes its weakness while Hamas’ military weakness becomes its strength. Seeing Gaza as a state-like entity and declaring war on it may help alter public opinion, allowing for definition of clear goals and less engagement in dialecticism. Declaration of war could help lay a foundation of awareness more suitable to a change of the second degree, i.e., a change of the system, to distinguish from a change of the first degree, i.e., a change within the system. Analyzing the significance and implications of a declaration of war, this article does not rely on a case of an actual recent declaration; rather, it challenges conventional thought and may help in transforming the conflict by laying the foundation for rearranging the system, so as to manage the conflict at a lower level of violence and perhaps even end and resolve it.

Abstract

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The Islamic State, whose establishment was announced over a year ago by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, started out as a quirky peculiarity, but has since turned into an influential element in the region as well as a challenge to the international community. The process of its establishment and expansion seems to have been facilitated by a convergence of four major trends: upheavals that led to the collapse of the region’s Arab nation states and their decline into a state failure process; an ideological vacuum initiated by disillusionment with pan-Arabism and the stinging inability of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam, particularly in Egypt, to fill that vacuum; the reluctance of the West to intervene in any substantive sense, combined with a lack of global leadership and an irrelevant US strategy;1 and the unwillingness of moderate opposition groups in Syria to cooperate and formulate a joint vision. These trends unfolded while jihadist organizations were present and active in the region.2 From an historical perspective, one can view the Islamic State as a product of the region’s chronic structural instability. Over the last century, the Middle East experienced four major upheavals, each of which led to the formation of a political structure at odds with the social framework that was based primarily on ethnic, tribal, or religious affiliations. This incompatibility inevitably eroded the legitimacy of the various regimes and heightened the potential for opposition and subversion. In most cases, the nation-state model survived, thanks to an authoritarian rule dependent on effective security and intelligence services.

Abstract

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military capabilities are the basis for realizing its political demands in the
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Abstract

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The state of Israel – since its independence in 1948 – continues to exist in a hostile environment. Such an environment has led Israel through years of strengthening military capabilities and consistently improving military might, thought and strategy. Political thought adjusted itself to military paradigms and the military establishment became the most appreciated and respected institute in Israel (Michael, 2007). There is doubt that the hegemony and supremacy of military thought narrowed the maneuver and flexibility spaces of the political echelon and it is reasonable to assume that the State of Israel missed some political and strategic opportunities that may have improved its geostrategic position. However, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the State of Israel has succeeded to flourish in its perilous neighborhood and has succeeded to tackle many strategic challenges in ways that continue to encourage its liberal and democratic characteristics and remain a part of the free world and one of the leading nations. If this is the reality, then what, precisely, are the problems? Is there a real strategic problem in a situation where military thought is the main emphasis? If it is a problem, how (and why) should it be dealt with? This article attempts to elaborate on these questions and to analyze the difficulties that the Israeli political echelon faces whenever it has to deal with complex strategic situations by exercising the paradoxical logic of strategy. The paradoxical logic of strategy and the difficulties to explain its logic to the public in order to gain public support and consensus that are required for major strategic moves in a democratic society continue to represent serious obstacles.

Abstract

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It is generally accepted that the peace process, launched in 1993, went off the tracks and failed to meet the expectations of the interested parties: the state of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community. The international discourse plays down the historical depth of the dispute and everything which pertains directly to the Jewish religious, national, and cultural heritage that dates back more than three millennia in the Land of Israel. Also absent from the international discourse is an awareness of the rich academic and theoretical foundation of knowledge with regard to peacemaking. Concepts such as the positive peace, reconciliation, “ripeness,” “stable peace”or“hurting mutual stalemate” have not been integrated into the discourse.
The condition of positive peace can be created when social justice mitigates structural land cultural violence. Cultural violence occurs when the political leadership of a movement or state incorporates continuous incitement to hatred and violence into a society’s public discourse. In contrast to negative peace, positive peace is not limited to the idea of getting rid of something but includes the idea of establishing something
that is missing and changing the societal and political structure.
A valid discussion of reviving the peace negotiations should adopt the goal of creating the positive peace and taking the necessary intermediate steps for its implementation. Otherwise, the presence of structural violence will occasion more physical violence, and cultural violence will provide both the justification and psychological infrastructure for its continued application.
The establishment of a Palestinian state which does not comply with the spirit of positive peace increases the chances of bringing into being one more failed and warlike state that would become a destabilizing force in the region. By inciting irredentist sentiment among its own population and the Arab citizens of Israel, it will endanger both Israel and Jordan. Instead of concentrating on state-building, it will become a subversive political entity that will continue to wage its long-standing political and military war against Israel, the Jewish state, and its citizens.

Abstract

Following the end of World War II, conflicts worldwide have changed greatly. “War,” according to the classical
definition, occurs with less and less frequency. Countries avoid involvement in formal warfare or categorizing
conflicts with other entities as war.
The field of Conflict Resolution developed after World War II seeking the reasons for the outbreak of conflicts
and clarifying new ways to settle them. More recently, a new approach called Conflict Transformation suggests
converting the relationship between parties as the way to settle a conflict.
Israel is a party to many interlocking conflicts, one of which is the protracted and intractable conflict with Hamas
in Gaza. This conflict is an extension of Israel’s ethno-social conflict with the Palestinian people. The
prominence of the conflict’s violent dimension brings society to exhaustion and to develop a psychological
infrastructure preserving and empowering the conflict’s vitality.
In an era in which war was an acceptable means to solve disputes between countries, the 1907 Hague
Convention obligated nations to declare war preceding the opening of hostilities. Israeli law governs declarations
of war, but policy makers prefer to conduct large-scale military operations without a formal declaration.
However, it is wider than a narrow legal act and is considered by Austin (1963) a "Speech Act," as well as a
"ceremony" (Turner, 2004). Because a declaration of war contains a credible threat regarding the ability to “hurt”
the other party, it serves as leverage to establish the necessary conditions between parties to reach a lasting peace.
Although the idea of a declaration of war seems to conflict with the logic of Conflict Resolution, in actuality,
applying the paradoxical principal of strategy—action against linear intuition—has the potential to settle the
conflict through its transformative power.
Through those various paradigms of declaration of war, we conceptualize mollifiers and fomenters for the
possibility to declare war in order to transform the conflict towards its resolution.

Abstract

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This article offers a conceptual framework that develops the theme of extra-institutional civilian control of the military. Extra-institutional control refers to actions generally taken by non-bureaucratic actors (mainly social movements and interest groups) acting in the public sphere in an attempt to bargain with the military or restrain it, either directly or through civilian state institutions. Extra-institutional actors select one or more of four areas in which to act: 1) direct bargaining, which is the informal cooperation of a group with the military designed to constrain the latter to benefit the former; 2) the public arena, including the legislative area; 3) the judicial arena; and 4) the arena of direct control, typified by civil organizations directly documenting the military's actions. Using the case of Israel, it is argued that, extra-institutional mechanisms are effective at restraining the military and narrowing its professional autonomous space. This often leads to a reshaping of institutional control either by enhancing or impairing institutional mechanisms.

November 18, 2010

Abstract

In this article the authors examine two set of issues that constrain contemporary peace support operations (PSOs): one centered on the kinds of knowledge prevalent in PSOs and the second involving the organizational structures that characterize them. The authors’ aim is to show the deep discursive and structural limitations and contradictions that continue to characterize the actions of armed forces and the dominance of militaristic thinking within PSOs. This article centers on multidimensional peacekeeping
marked by emphasizing two main points in regard to the complex nature of such peacekeeping. First, Western military thinking is still dominant in the professional discourse of peacekeeping despite the fact that in many cases it is less relevant to the arenas where it is applied (in weakened or failed states). Second, forces in second-generation peacekeeping missions are by definition a form of hybrid organizations,
and therefore conceptual changes in regard to PSOs not only involve the realm of knowledge but also entail practical consequences for the very organizational means used to achieve their aims. The authors’ analysis demonstrates the blending, hybridization, and linkages that are an essential part of PSOs as processes that carry both advantages and disadvantages for organizational action.

Abstract

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The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward intrastate conflicts—known in military jargon as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)—pose a challenge to the nature of the interaction between the political and the military echelons in general and in Israel—where such a conflict has been a protracted reality since 2000—in particular. While, in these instances, political supremacy is maintained on institutional and formal levels, on the substantial level, which requires reliance on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political position is weakened and substantive civilian control is wanting. I characterize the interactions between the political and the military echelons in Israel during the last half-decade as a “discourse space” imbued with military content and characterized by a blurred political directive. The concept of “epistemic authority” is borrowed from the field of social psychology. Showing how Israel’s military echelon has become an “epistemic authority” with regard to the confrontation with the Palestinians, in the eyes of both the general public and the political echelon in Israel, is elucidated through both the nature of the political-military
interaction during this period and the weakness of civilian control of the military. The operations launched by the Israeli military, according to its own interpretation of the politicians’ intentions and following its newly
developed knowledge, helped shape the conflict environment and were perceived by politicians and by most of the Israeli public as justified. The
military’s hegemonic role in the conflict, in its turn, resulted from the inherent
weakness of political control of the military and, at the same time, was a
fresh indication of it. The weakness of civilian control of the military in this
period suggests that political thinking in Israel is inadequate and attests to
the threat to both the supremacy of its civilian sphere and the delimitation
of the military’s influence over its politics.

Abstract

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The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) intrastate conflict have challenged the patterns of interaction between the political and the military echelons in Israel. It seems that the political echelon’s superiority is maintained at the institutional and formal levels, but on the substantive level, which demands relying on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political echelon’s position is weakened and loses its validity.
Introducing the military echelon in Israel as an epistemic authority regarding the violent confrontation and the main outlines of the military knowledge development process might clarify why the absence of the required dialogue between the echelons and the weakness of the intellectual effort increased the
military’s influence over the shaping of Israeli conflict-management strategy. The argument’s validity and its explanatory power can be found relevant for other countries whose militaries are deeply involved in the management of LIC.

Abstract

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National security conception or securitization theory frames threats and conceptualizes the responses towards them. But in many cases, and especially in the Israeli context, there is a tendency to blur the nature and essence of different threats; security threats become strategic threats and then existential threats. In the Israeli context, because the broad concept of security is perceived, in most cases, as equivalent to military security, the meaning of the strategic threat will be framed, mostly, militarily, derived from military
thought. The article examines the nature of existential threats in the Israeli context and seeks to find the implications of securitization theory in this regard by analyzing the unique role of the military establishment and the influence of the military thought on strategic thought in Israel. The article also deals with the
centrality of ‘military wisdom’ in the Israeli ethos and the sense of insecurity embedded in the Israeli narrative that leads to an ‘intellectual symbiosis’ between the political and the military echelons and finds this phenomenon as one of the major explanations for the influence of the military establishment on
defining the nature of security threats as well as on the crucial decision to launch wars.

April 19, 2007

Abstract

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There is a common desire to seek a proper equilibrium that will assure civilian superiority over the military and prevent the military's intervention in domestic affairs. This article addresses the unique situation in Israel during the Oslo process, in which the military was deeply involved in the political process and influenced the political echelon by its knowledge and persuasive argumentation, mostly in private intellectual encounters between the echelons. We show how the military led the civilian arm to make choices that eventually determined strategy. The military with its knowledge infrastructure was hegemonic in this encounter, its influence was significant, and civil control was weak or inefficient. The Discourse Space model used in this article provides complementary tools for describing and analyzing the encounter between the echelons. The model provides an appropriate examination of how this encounter was conducted and what outcomes it produced, at least for the Israeli case.

September 04, 2007

Abstract

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On June 4, 2007 the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies held a conference dedicated to elucidating the background to the Arab Peace Initiative, its textual, historical and political meanings and, in particular, its ramifications for the major players in the region. In light of the Initiative's importance, we sought to determine whether it represents a true historic opportunity and to determine, should this indeed prove to be the case, what measures might be taken to ensure that the opportunity is not missed. The many positive reactions generated by the conference led to our decision to publish this book, which contains seven brief
essays penned by the conference participants.

June 30, 2005

Abstract

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The violent confrontation which erupted between Israel and the Palestinians in September 2000 developed into a continuing low-intensity conflict which has claimed a steep price in blood on both sides, caused serious economic damage, and raised the level of mutual enmity and mistrust to heights that all but preclude
dialogue. The sense of impasse and the failure of the efforts to end the confrontation or reduce its intensity led researchers of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies to reexamine Israel's modes of conflict management over the past four years. The goal is to propose a conceptual framework which offers conflict-management alternatives of a more controlled character, thus facilitating the transition from management to resolution. The Palestinians' conflict management, which also merits an in-depth examination, is not addressed here even though it is a major consideration in Israel's management of the conflict.

Abstract

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The collapse of the Oslo process, which began with the outbreak of violence in September 2000, has caused great physical and psychological damage to both Israelis and Palestinians, who, despite the assistance of the international community, have not succeeded in renewing the political process and stopping the violence, at least not in a lasting and meaningful way. Since the death of Yassir Arafat (Nov. 2004), the election of Mahmood Abbas as Palestinian President (Jan. 2005), and especially since the Israeli Unilateral Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank (Sept. 2005), a new trend of calm and a reduction (not a cessation) in violence have prevailed. Yet it seems too early to speak of a return to a negotiated political process based on the rejection of violence as a legitimate means of achieving political aims, especially in light of Hamas political stance and the violent internal conflict between the Palestinian factions.
The international community, which was harnessed in an effort to secure a ceasefire and return the sides to September 2000 conditions, has not succeeded in generating meaningful change. The question that remains to be answered at this point is “why?” Is the failure of all international intervention efforts a result of conceptual shortfalls, structural failures, the absence of Israeli and Palestinian political will, the absence of determination among the international community or the lack of ripeness and necessary prerequisites?
Is it possible to discern a common thread throughout all the failures? Is it possible that the failure of these interventions was known in advance?
This article will explore possible answers to the troubling questions posed above. In addressing the failure of diplomatic intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we will draw on lessons learned from another
kind of international intervention, the peace support operation. Although diplomatic interventions are not peace support operations, both are members of the same spectrum of international intervention, and some lessons from the latter may prove relevant to the former.

The article will begin with a short review of recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, addressing the main factors that brought about a change in Israel’s conflict management strategy. After a short, critical
overview of the nature and rationale of conventional peacekeeping, we will continue with a description and analysis of the characteristics of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict zone, addressing its uniqueness as a bi-level arena and explaining the conceptual difficulty of peacekeeping operations in this context. We will then present the characteristics of international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as a typology that explains their failure. We then review a series of lessons learned from the peacebuilding aspects of the American experience in Iraq (stabilization and reconstruction efforts), drawing out the most relevant ones for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We conclude by offering possible recommendations for the reexamination of a number of conceptual foundations of peacekeeping operations, with the aim of developing a more relevant conceptual framework for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone.

Abstract

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This monograph attempts to analyze the characteristics of a unique Israeli-Palestinian intergroup interaction – namely, the joint operation of Israeli and Palestinian security patrol teams in the southern Gaza Strip between 1994-96.

In describing this activity and examining the reasons for its progress as a conflictual interaction, the author makes use of numerous theoretical concepts and principles drawn from the fields of social psychology and conflict resolution. He adds to the academic perspective his personal experience as the Israeli commander of the District Coordination Office (DCO) in the Gaza Strip during the period of the study.