October 14, 2020

Abstract

The Palestinian system has been going through a process of critical reassessment for several months. There have been some attempts at rapprochement between the two principal camps – Fatah on the one hand, and Hamas and the other factions on the other. The most recent catalyst behind such efforts was the normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE, which was interpreted as a withdrawal of the Arab support for the strategy underlying the Palestinians’ national struggle against Israel. In turn, the Palestinian camps are trying to promote internal understandings and agreement toward an updated strategy for the struggle. This is an unprecedented development in Palestinian national history. At a meeting in Istanbul on September 24, 2020 between the senior members of both camps, it was clear how seriously they view the developments that distance the Palestinian issue from the top of the regional agenda. That same day, INSS held a discussion on two approaches that assess the prospects for reconciliation between the Palestinian camps. This article analyzes these approaches, while considering the significance for Israel of the strategic assessment process currently underway in the Palestinian theater.

October 11, 2020

Abstract

Recent reports have linked Israel to the conflict between the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) and Qatar. These reports speculate that in return for United States pressure on the Quartet to end the boycott on Qatar, Doha will agree to join the Abraham Accords framework and normalize its relations with Israel. Reaching an agreement of this kind is not an easy task because of the tension and even hostility between the Saudi and UAE regimes and Qatar. Another hurdle is the need to persuade Doha to lessen its support for the Palestinians, which has recently become stronger. It is not at all certain whether a thaw in the tension between Qatar and its neighbors will lead it to give up its considerable influence with Hamas and with the Palestinian Authority. Even if the United States manages to persuade Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to rescind the boycott on Qatar and secure its entry into the Abraham Accords framework, tension will likely remain between Qatar and the UAE, which has already signed a normalization agreement with Israel. This tension could pose a complex challenge to Israel regarding its relations with both these countries, particularly vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue. An additional challenge for Israel is the need to maintain its qualitative military edge, in light of recent reports that Qatar is eager to purchase F-35 aircraft from the United States.

September 24, 2020

Abstract

Yet a clear-eyed and balanced vision of the deal must also address the significant, overarching challenges that will threaten the success of the agreement. There are some aspects of the Emirati-Israeli relationship that might have best been kept in the dark due to potential backlash from regional rivals Iran and Turkey. What's more, Israel and the UAE do not fully align on several key regional issues. For instance, Israel is likely to be more trigger happy vis-à-vis Iran in the Gulf, whereas UAE might feel similarly inclined in the Mediterranean regarding Turkey. Generally, while the deal fosters better security cooperation between the UAE and Israel in handling Salafi jihadist, Iranian, and Turkish threats, it also increases the intensity of those threats.

August 22, 2020

Abstract

The normalization agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, announced with much fanfare on August 13, 2020, comes at a time when the Palestinian camp is at one of its weakest strategic points since its establishment. Senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials responded with a mixture of outrage and frustration, and the PA has clearly lost an important asset – its veto power over normalization between Israel and the Arab world. However, precisely in these circumstances, Israel would do well to adopt a broad, supportive approach toward the PA, backed by measures that will improve the PA’s ability to control its territory effectively, which can lead to renewed security coordination with Israeli security forces. Israel should also include the PA in economic and technological initiatives developed with the UAE, so that the PA will also be able to enjoy the benefits of the agreement.

April 26, 2020

Abstract

Out of fears of a COVID-19 outbreak in Gaza as well as a desire to strengthen public trust in the organization and demonstrate its control over the situation, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, has proposed an initiative to release prisoners. The initiative led to indirect talks between Israel and Hamas, which may foster a wider arrangement. Israel should not make concessions solely for information on its citizens and the bodies of its soldiers being held in Gaza, but strive to bring them back while also working to bring about a better security reality for after the coronavirus crisis.

April 05, 2020

Abstract

The Palestinian arena was already in a weakened state and at a political, economic, and national crossroads in both the West Bank, under the Palestinian Authority, and the Gaza Strip, under Hamas rule, when the corona pandemic hit. The situation in the West Bank is better than in Gaza, which in part reflects a significant gap in the capabilities of the respective leaderships to confront the crisis. While the Palestinian Authority is striving to prove its ability to deal with the crisis, there is serious concern in the Gaza Strip that the potential spread of the virus, with the area’s inadequate healthcare system and generally poor civilian infrastructure, will exacerbate the existing humanitarian plight and even endanger Hamas’s hold on power, including its ability to rein in elements that seek a confrontation with Israel. For its part, Israel provides medical and other assistance to both areas. In tandem, it must prepare for a decline in the security situation in both areas, particularly in the Gaza Strip, yet also prepare for continued coordination and cooperation with both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas once the crisis is over, based on insights gleaned from the interactions with them during the crisis.

January 14, 2020

Abstract

The participation of East Jerusalem residents in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections has become a matter of contention between Hamas and Fatah. While the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority has conditioned this participation on Israeli consent, Hamas has insisted that there is no such requirement and that the two sides should wage a joint struggle to force Israel to let this population participate. Neither party is enthused by the idea of elections and both would prefer that they be deferred, but each has painted itself into a corner and is trying to foist responsibility for a postponement on the other. Mahmoud Abbas, who began the process, and the Fatah organization are liable to pay a high price should they be saddled with the blame. East Jerusalemites participated in PLC and presidential elections in the past, and are today permitted to participate in elections in accordance with the interim accords signed by Israel and the PLO. It behooves Israel not to cast itself as an element opposing these elections, but rather, invoke the conditions set out in the accords for participating in elections: renunciation of terrorism and violence, and respect of commitments stipulated in the accords.

November 04, 2019

Abstract

The barrage of rockets launched at Sderot and the Gaza periphery by the Islamic Jihad in northern Gaza on the night of November 1, 2019 underscored the Israeli dilemma regarding the Gaza Strip. This attack was yet another indication of the rise of the Islamic Jihad, which impacts on Hamas's status, security stability in Gaza, and prospects for Israel reaching an accommodation with Hamas. For Hamas, Islamic Jihad’s growing strength is a provocation, and highlights that Hamas is a "resistance movement" devoid of active "resistance." A weakened Hamas serves Israel's interest regarding a return of the Palestinian Authority to effective control over the Strip, yet it is highly doubtful that the PA will try to regain control in the Strip, as long as there is no political breakthrough in relations with Israel. Therefore, Israel has three main alternatives: a continuation of the status quo vis-à-vis Hamas and the Gaza Strip; military escalation in the Gaza theater; and accommodation with Hamas. Because continuing with the current situation carries a high risk of escalation into a broad military campaign, which would be liable to wreak havoc in the Strip, and because Israel has no interest under the current circumstances to escalate the situation militarily, accommodation is the least problematic alternative. Understandings reached with Hamas that calm the security situation would facilitate a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and their enforcement would attenuate Islamic Jihad's spoiler potential and, perforce, Iranian clout in the Strip.

September 18, 2019

Abstract

ההיגיון המארגן של האסטרטגיה הישראלית הוא להחליש את שתי הישויות הפלסטיניות: הרשות הפלסטינית בגדה המערבית וחמאס ברצועת עזה, ולשמר את חולשתן באופן שיאפשר לישראל למנוע או לפחות להקטין את הלחץ הבינלאומי ואת הלחץ, הפחות משמעותי, מבית לחדש את התהליך המדיני, בתנאים או לתכלית שאינם מקובלים על ישראל, כאשר לחלופין, המתווה המועדף מבחינת ממשלת ישראל אינו יכול להתקבל על הצד הפלסטיני.

ישראל שביקשה לקבע מציאות של שתי ישויות פלסטיניות מוחלשות, כל אחת בדרכה, מוצאת עצמה במציאות שבה שתי הישויות הפלסטיניות אכן חלשות משהיו בעבר ואולי אף חלשות יותר ממה שהתכוונה ממשלת ישראל, כשהגדירה לעצמה את יעדי הבידול, ואשר מבקשת להימנע ממערכה צבאית רחבה ברצועת עזה ומהתדרדרות של המציאות הביטחונית בגדה המערבית. התוצאה היא "לימבו אסטרטגי" וסיכון גובר להסלמה רבתי בשתי הגזרות גם יחד.

מאחר שההיתכנות להכרעה צבאית של חמאס ולחזרת הרשות הפלסטינית לרצועה ("על כידוני צה"ל") נמוכה ביותר, נראה שישראל נותרת עם אפשרות, בעייתית ומורכבת כשלעצמה, אך אולי גרועה פחות בהשוואה לאחרות, והיא אפשרות ההסדרה הרחבה והמשמעותית ברצועת עזה עם תג המחיר הנלווה לכך, תוך הבנה שבמקרה שחמאס תפר את כללי ההסדרה – ישראל תגיב בעוצמה צבאית משמעותית יותר מבעבר.

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June 25, 2019

Abstract

Several months ago, a Palestine Liberation Organization body published an official document on the conflict. In its 37 pages, the organization put forth its views, with some readers seeing this as a clear endorsement of the two-state solution and even a willingness to relinquish the so-called right of return of Palestinian “refugees.”

However, reading this document in detail leads to the exact opposite conclusion.

May 18, 2019

Abstract

The results of the elections in Israel (9 April 2019) can only be understood as an impressive and significant achievement by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the right-wing in Israel. The success of the Blue and White party (35 seats) is the result of a wave of votes from the Labour and Meretz parties, but it does not reflect a real increase in the Central Bloc. Voters who support the centre-left parties strategically chose to give their vote to Blue and White, although identified as having right-wing views, because they believed it is the only possible way to replace Netanyahu. If we add to this the 300,000 votes for the New Right party and the Identity party, which are identified as right-wingers but did not pass the threshold, it is clear that the right in Israel, together with the ultra-Orthodox parties, wins an overwhelming majority and its real weight is about 75 seats (out of 120)

March 31, 2019

Abstract

Faced with a multi-level dilemma regarding the Gaza Strip, Hamas might choose to respond to Egypt’s efforts to broker a settlement and move toward an acceptance of Israeli terms, in order to bring about a swift improvement in the humanitarian situation and present this to the Gaza population as a substantive achievement. In the cost-benefit analysis that compares this with a toppling of the Hamas government or a reoccupation of Gaza, Israel should accept the existence of a hostile state entity controlled by Hamas on its southern border - although ironically in that case it would itself be the element that saves Hamas from disintegration, just as the PLO was saved from disintegration following the Oslo process. The more this hostile entity is prepared to adopt logical political conduct, the easier it will be for Israel to deal with it. The option of dealing with a hostile state entity in Gaza while maintaining military deterrence on the one hand, and developing essential cooperation in civilian fields and allowing life in the Gaza Strip under reasonable conditions on the other hand, is the least worst option for Israel, even when it is clear that this future reality will also involve violent crises from time to time.

December 18, 2018

Abstract

Even if Israel succeeds in arresting further terrorism in the West Bank, recent events underscore that it must adopt a new paradigm that provides a relevant response to greater strategic interests, and not just to immediate concerns each time escalation occurs. Conflict management in the name of an illusory status quo is leading Israel toward a one-state reality, even if there is no official Israeli declaration of support for a one-state solution. To avoid sliding into this reality, a “strategic road map” is proposed, based on four elements: (a) Israel’s ongoing operational security freedom of action throughout the entire territory, but with a significant reduction of the potential for friction with the Palestinian population; (b) continued cooperation with the Palestinian security apparatuses and assistance toward improved PA governance in the West Bank; (c) a political horizon by means of a willingness to enter into negotiations with the PA regarding transitional arrangements, focusing initially on issues that can be solved and implemented immediately; and (d) Israeli assistance to international and regional efforts to reconstruct the Gaza Strip, on the condition that they be carried out by the PA upon the renewal of its control in this region. A stable PA functioning as a responsible party is in Israel’s interest, and it is a mistake for Israel to allow Hamas to consolidate its control over the Gaza Strip and at the same time launch terrorist attacks in the West Bank - while it enjoy the benefits of security calm and the possibility for military buildup in Gaza.

November 14, 2018

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the gradual emergence of closer relations between the State of Israel and a number of “pragmatic” Arab Gulf states, manifested in a growing number of cautious measures of normalization. This process reached a new height with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to Oman, the first public visit in 22 years of an Israeli prime minister to the sultanate. To be sure, Israel’s relations with Oman are not new, but  the publicity surrounding Netanyahu’s visit – in addition to the official presence of the Israeli judo delegation in Abu Dhabi and the extensive media coverage of Miri Regev, Minister of Culture and Sport, at the event – bespeaks an evolving willingness on the part of some Gulf states to expose more of their relations with Israel in their domestic arenas, and to signal publicly their readiness to move forward gradually in normalizing relations with Israel, albeit subject to concrete progress in the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Oman holds tools to assist in the political process, if only due to its current capacity as the only actor that enjoys some level of confidence from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Israel would be wise to take advantage of its achievements in the regional arena and leverage the significant improvement in its regional status, particularly its improved relations with Oman, in pursuit of its strategic interests.

November 14, 2018

Abstract

The Trump administration is reportedly working to create a joint Arab military force. This force, which the administration refers to as the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), has already been dubbed an Arab NATO. From the perspective of the United States, a regional Arab coalition could reduce or prevent the need for the deployment of American troops in the Middle East, as such an alliance could, in principle, fight Iranian subversion and support for terrorism, as well as take action to curb Iranian weapons smuggling to Iranian proxies. The attempt to establish an Arab military alliance is not new, and the history of such efforts does not bode well for the future of the Arab NATO, which at this point appears to harbor overly ambitious objectives. In the short and medium terms, Israel has an interest in an inter-Arab alliance meant to focus on Iran’s mounting involvement in the region. However, in the long term, this alliance, if it is established, could have additional significance that is not all positive for Israel. Regime changes within member states, for example, which could be accompanied by changes in priorities, could generate renewed anti-Israel hostility in an Arab region that possesses greater unity and military capability than today.

September 05, 2018

Abstarct

On August 31, 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States will cease funding UNRWA, citing the organization’s operational-business model as unsustainable, given its "endlessly and exponentially expanding community of entitled beneficiaries." This decision is no less than historic. Although the Palestinians view it as a serious blow, if it is presented as a necessary step on the path to Palestinian statehood, it has the potential to harbor long term, positive implications. While Israel should certainly prepare for negative scenarios that such a policy move may generate in the near term, it is unwise to cling to the current paradigm that distances the Palestinian leadership's pragmatic and ethical responsibility for rehabilitating and resettling Palestinian refugees within the Palestinian territories. With staunch Israeli, American, and international incentives and policy initiatives, the US decision to cease funding UNRWA can serve as a wake-up call to the Palestinian leadership and potentially inject new life into the Israeli-Palestinian process

July 09, 2018

לכשיסתלק מחמוד עבאס (אבו מאזן) מן הבימה הציבורית הפלסטינית, יהיה זה גם סיומה של תקופה. עד כה, 36 שנים, מאוגוסט 1982, עמדו מנהיגי אש"ף תוניס – יאסר ערפאת, ועבאס אחריו – בראש הפירמידה הפוליטית הפלסטינית. יבוא מי שיבוא אחרי עבאס, חילופי ההנהגה הצפויים אינם רק חילופי דורות, אלא גם סיום תפקידו ההיסטורי של דור המייסדים, מה שכונה במשך שנים "אש"ף חוץ".

עבאס נמצא בדמדומי נשיאותו ומנהיגותו, והמערכת הפלסטינית נדרכת לקראת עזיבתו את הזירה, בין אם מבחירה ובין אם בגין מצבו הרפואי. דריכות רבה ניכרת גם בישראל ובמדינות השכנות, עקב ההשלכות הצפויות על היציבות האזורית במקרה של קריסת המערכת הפלסטינית, בהיעדר תהליך מוסכם לבחירת יורש או יורשים לגיטימיים.

לישראל אינטרס מובהק בקיומה של רשות פלסטינית מתפקדת ויציבה, המסוגלת לטפל באוכלוסייה האזרחית, מתנגדת להתבססות החמאס ולמעורבות של גורמים מערערי יציבות כדוגמת איראן והג'האדיה־סלפיה, ומחויבת לתיאום עם ישראל ולשיתוף פעולה ביטחוני עמה. לישראל יכולת למתן חלק מהמגמות השליליות, לתמוך בתהליכי הסדרה של המערכת הפלסטינית ולשמר באופן משכנע את האפשרות והאופק לפתרון שתי מדינות הלאום. את אלו יכולה לעשות ישראל באופן מדוד וזהיר, מבלי להסתבך בניסיון "להנדס" פוליטית את המערכת הפלסטינית או לכפות עליה הנהגה מועדפת.

לצד מאמץ מתואם לשיפור יכולות המשילות וחיזוק הכלכלה, חיוני מבחינת ישראל לבסס את ההסכמות עם שותפותיה בהפעלת המאמץ למנוע, או לצמצם משמעותית, השפעה איראנית וטורקית. עליה לסייע להנהגה הפלסטינית, תהיה אשר תהיה, למנוע מחמאס לנצל את שעת הכושר הפוליטית ולשבש כל מאמץ להתבססות צבאית ופוליטית בגדה המערבית. בה בעת, על ישראל להיערך לאתגר המשמעותי יותר של ערעור כרוני של היציבות שיביא לקריסת המערכת הפלסטינית, ולפתח יכולות התנהלות למול תת־מערכות פלסטיניות מבוזרות.

June 20, 2018

תקציר

טרור העפיפונים עלול להוביל למערכה צבאית שאף צד לא מעוניין בה. תחת ההנחה שישראל לא מעוניינת בהסלמה צבאית, מנסה חמאס לעצב מחדש את משוואת ההרתעה ההדדית | בתהליך די מובן נדחפה ישראל להסלים את התגובה הצבאית לעפיפונים, למרות שזאת טעות אסטרטגית | כך עלו הצדדים על מסלול שמנוגד לאינטרסים שלהם, העלול להוביל למערכה צבאית שאף צד לא מעוניין בה. 

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May 30, 2018

התדרדרות למערכה צבאית נוספת בהחלט אפשרית, אף שהיא בניגוד מוחלט לרצון הצדדים ולאינטרסים שלהם. אלא שבסופה של מערכה נוספת, תמצא עצמה ישראל במקום דומה מאוד למקום שבו הייתה טרם המערכה ועם ההכרח שבהתמודדות עם אותן בעיות ואתגרים. לכן, חשוב להבין את נקודת השפל האסטרטגית שבה מצוי חמאס ואת שעת הכושר שאולי בשלה לשינוי המציאות הקיימת. אין מדובר בהכרח בחלופה אופטימאלית, אך בהשוואה לחלופות האחרות, היא כנראה הפחות גרועה מביניהן..

May 21, 2018

The idea of the “March of Return,” which was initiated by civil organizations in the Gaza Strip seeking once more to direct the attention of the international community to the suffering of the local population by means of mass demonstrations along the border, was hijacked by Hamas. Hamas pushed aside the organizers of the project and in effect took over the production and direction of the events. For its part, Israel is capable of accommodating a hostile entity living beside it, as long as this entity is restrained, deterred, and functional. This aim can only be achieved after Israel recognizes the need to develop separate strategies vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, exhaust every possibility of taking advantage of Hamas’s current weakness, and leverage Hamas’s willingness for a long term hudna. The proposed strategy is also based on the understanding that the Palestinian Authority will not resume its rule in the Gaza Strip in the foreseeable future, and that effort must be invested to consolidate the PA’s governance in the West Bank and improve the living conditions, freedom of movement, and economy in that area, while also securing the conditions for the future achievement of two nation states.

May 16, 2018

March 25, 2018

Absract

The move is also designed to serve the Hamas leadership in Gaza in its struggle within the Palestinian arena, given its assessment that the reconciliation talks with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) are doomed to fail, and to position Hamas as leader of the struggle and a worthy alternative to Fatah.

The move is likewise presumably designed to divert the frustration of Gaza’s citizens with Hamas to the national struggle against Israel. The hope is that a large-scale move will push Israel to a corner showing unarmed citizens protesting their predicament against armed troops. This is the cognitive message that Hamas seeks to relay to the world. It also appears that the march’s organizers intend to draw a parallel between the Nakba and the Holocaust, by dressing the participants in striped prisoner uniforms.

March 19, 2018

Abstarct

The Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip is heavily engaged in preparations for a the “Great March of Return,” scheduled for May 14, 2018, when thousands of Gaza’s Palestinians will march toward the security fence and position themselves in tent cities along the Israeli border. The event is intended to highlight the Palestinian refugee issue and connect it to the plight of those living the Gaza Strip, while positioning Hamas as the leader of the national struggle and a worthy alternative to Fatah. Although the move aims for cognitive achievements in Palestinian and international consciousness, it confronts Israel with a challenge that involves a security-physical threat in the form of an attempt to cross the Israeli border. At the same, Israeli retaliation would cast Israel in a bad light vis-à-vis the various target audiences. Therefore, Israel must foil this Palestinian effort to organize another form of campaign against it. The goal is to disrupt Hamas’s planned protest march before it starts, and show determination regarding the intention and ability to obstruct it if it takes place. Success of the protest, even if partial, with deterioration to violence, Palestinian casualties, and international sentiment translated into pressure on Israel, could trigger additional similar events, both in Gaza and the West Bank.

March 13, 2018

Abstract

Qatar's support for Hamas and its investment in the Gaza Strip, though based more on pragmatism than on ideological identification, suit its foreign policy, which supports political Islam and aims to increase Doha’s influence in the Middle East. Qatar's support for Hamas and political Islam, along with what to the Egyptian regime is subversive behavior, casts a shadow over its relations with Egypt. Against this background, Israel finds itself on the horns of a dilemma, because in addition to the interest it shares with Qatar in providing a response to the humanitarian distress in Gaza, it must maintain and foster its strategic relations with Egypt and ensure Egyptian involvement, and perhaps even leadership, over the aid efforts.

March 06, 2018

Vice President Pence’s trip to the Middle East, and the responses of regional allies such as Egypt and Jordan, show that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the United States’ top diplomatic priority in the region. Instead, the United States seems far more concerned with the Iranian nuclear threat, and is determined to undo the Iran nuclear deal, known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), unless all the signatories can reach a deal on substantial, and not simply cosmetic, changes to the agreement

February 05, 2018

The Central Council’s resolutions following Abbas’s speech reflect a decidedly defiant approach, as well as dismay and exasperation. However, as in the past, it is extremely doubtful if the PLO Executive Council will adopt the resolutions and implement them word for word. Abbas, as chairman of the Executive Council, is empowered to take the necessary action to implement the resolutions as mandated by circumstances. However, the chances are that this time too he will be in no rush to implement them, in view of the risk their implementation poses to the future and to the very survival of the Palestinian Authority, which is a distinct interest of Abbas and the PLO seniors who support him.

December 25, 2017

בסך הכול אנו עדים להעדר הלימה בין ההכרזות הפוליטיות, ההתלהמות והקריאה להתנגדות עממית (על ידי הנהגת הרשות הפלסטינית) ולאינתיפאדה שלישית (על ידי הנהגת חמאס) לבין מידת נכונותו של הציבור הפלסטיני להתגייס לחידוש ההתנגדות העממית או האלימה. יש כמה הסברים אפשריים.

המציאות החברתית, הכלכלית והפוליטית בזירה הפלסטינית, בדגש על הגדה המערבית, מצביעה על העדר אנרגיה מספקת להתפרצות אלימה מאורגנת בדמות אינתיפאדה רחבת היקף. אלא שהמציאות הפלסטינית מושפעת משורה של גורמים פנימיים וחיצוניים, שבתנאים מסוימים עלולים להוביל להיווצרותם של וקטורים שיניעו מגמות ותהליכים שהרשות הפלסטינית תתקשה להכיל או לרסן מבעוד מועד.

December 05, 2017

החלטת הנשיא האמריקני, במידה ואכן תיפול, היא לא רק מימוש הבטחת בחירות וזכות סוברנית מלאה של
ארה"ב לקבוע את מקום שגרירותה בבירה המוצהרת של בת בריתה המשמעותית ביותר במזרח התיכון,
אלא שינוי כיוון פרדיגמטי של הממשל האמריקני. החלטת הנשיא טראמפ מבטאת הבנה שהמדיניות
האמריקנית אינה יכולה להיוותר כבת ערובה בידי וטו פלסטיני. מדובר בהתייחסות אמריקנית להתחמקות
פלסטינית מכל פתרון בירושלים ו בנה שהמשך המדיניות הקיימת של דחיית החלטת הקונגרס, אינה מקדמת את
התהליך המדיני ואינה מספקת לפלסטינים כל תמריץ לחידוש התהליך, ושאולי ההיפך מכך, כן.

November 08, 2017

Abstract

Israel’s proven ability to locate and destroy tunnels undermines the rationale of the enemy system (including both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) whereby attack tunnels are a strategic and psychological tool par excellence. Despite the pressure to respond to Israel’s destruction of the Gaza tunnel because of the many casualties, it seems that Hamas does not want escalation at a time that it is focused on implementing the reconciliation agreement with Fatah. As a military escalation with Israel would hurt Hamas, the organization will therefore try to restrain the other organizations, and if there is a response it will likely be limited. For its part, Israel must both preserve its strong deterrence and prevent escalation. In this setting, Israel should assess the reconciliation process between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and consider its possible contribution to stability in the Gaza Strip. While the chances of success are slim, the very existence of such a process may serve Israel’s strategic interests and enable the shaping of a reality that is more convenient for both Israel and the Gaza Strip population.

September 23, 2017

לכאורה נראה שחמאס, המצויה בנקודת שפל אסטרטגית – כשלצדה רק איראן, שיכולתה לסייע מוגבלת, וכן טורקיה וקטאר – נאלצת להתפשר ולהסכים לדרישת הנשיא הפלסטיני להחזיר את ממשלת ההסכמה הפלסטינית לרצועת עזה. אלא שהמהלך שמובילה חמאס מותיר את היוזמה בידיה ודוחק את אבו מאזן לפינת הדילמה, מאחר שהוא מבין את משמעויות חזרתה של ממשלה פלסטינית לרצועת עזה. הרצועה נשלטת צבאית על ידי חמאס, אך הממשלה היא שתידרש למימוש האחריות לשיקום הרצועה ולרווחת תושביה, וכך עלולה להיחשף לביקורת ציבורית, שתוסט מחמאס אליה ואל אבו מאזן. גם הנשיא הפלסטיני אינו מעוניין בבחירות כלליות בעת הזאת ולא בצירוף חמאס למוסדות אש"ף ברוח הסכם קהיר 2011.

Abstract

Despite the announcement by the Hamas leadership that it was willing to disband the administrative

committee for the Gaza Strip, which was founded six months ago as an act of defiance against PA President

Mahmoud Abbas, the road to Palestinian reconciliation is still long. Moreover, it is quite likely that Hamas has maneuvered skillfully, and has successfully caught Abbas and the PA in a honey trap, since if the PA-led Palestinian government returns to Gaza, it will assume the heavy responsibility for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip and the welfare of the population. This is liable to divert public criticism from Hamas to the Palestinian government. Israel has no substantive influence on the current maneuvers for reconciliation in the Palestinian arena, and should not intervene in them at this stage. At the same time, the PA is still the most comfortable partner for Israel in reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, following many years of cooperation in the civilian and security spheres.

July 27, 2017

Israel is forced to maneuver with the fire hose between the pyromaniacs, who all seek to burn the place. Israel is not immune from mistakes, and in the delicate maneuvering, mistakes are made and it’s good that they are being corrected. However, it is important and right to understand the events on the Temple Mount as a reflection of the broader regional reality.

That which takes place in this holy place reflects a cynical reality in which religion becomes the guardian of politics in the fierce struggle between the camps in the Middle East and a dangerous weapon in the hands of political Islam. When we’re talking about a place that is so volatile and explosive, it is important to beware of pyromaniacs and keep them far away from there.

July 26, 2017

הקמפיין שמוביל השייח' ראאד סלאח, מנהיג הפלג הצפוני של התנועה האסלאמית בישראל, שהיא שלוחה של האחים המוסלמים, מקבל גיבוי ותמיכה מתנועת חמאס, שהיא שלוחה פלסטינית של האחים המוסלמים, ומטורקיה בהנהגתו של ארדואן, מנהיג ה-AKP, שהיא שלוחה טורקית של האחים המוסלמים. שייח' ראאד סלאח הצליח לייצב קואליציה של תנועות האסלאם הפוליטי ולייצר משולש מסוכן והרסני הפועל במרחב הרגיש והנפיץ ביותר במזרח התיכון.

Abstract

Events of recent weeks in both nearby and distant arenas have reshuffled the cards vis-à-vis the state of affairs in the Gaza Strip. The result has been the emergence of possible conditions for change – that is, if Israel takes advantage of them through cooperation with Egypt and the Gulf states. Recent developments have created circumstances and constraints for the actors in the arena that can potentially be leveraged as strategic opportunities to reshape the Gaza arena. Cooperation between Israel, Egypt, and the Gulf states, alongside Hamas’s strategic weakness and Mohammed Dahlan’s possible mediating role in the Gaza arena, allow a reframing of the rules of the game.

Abstract

President Trump’s statements during his recent visit to the Middle East reflect a profound commitment to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. To this end, President Trump is demonstrating his desire to avoid the mistakes of the preceding administration, which was not successful in advancing an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Nevertheless, despite the different “spirit” that President Trump brings with him regarding the peace process, it is difficult to understand the basis of his firm belief in his ability to “close a deal” between Israel and the Palestinians. In the end, the fundamental positions of the two sides are well known, and for the foreseeable future the gaps defy bridging. As President Trump presumably understands this, his main goal therefore seems to be to jumpstart a political process in a regional context, in order to create an infrastructure for a regional coalition in the struggle against jihad terrorism and against Iranian subversion.

Abstract

The severing of relations between Qatar and the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on the grounds that Qatar has been supporting terrorism, which follows on the heels of President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, will have serious regional implications. Closing Qatar’s sea and air space and the land border with Saudi Arabia are tantamount to casus belli and could lead to chaos in the emirate if not solved soon. Isolating Qatar will also have serious regional implications on Israel and the Palestinian arena. Qatar is one of the main financial supporters of the reconstruction Gaza Strip, in addition to paying salaries within the Hamas government and helping to provide services to Gaza Strip residents. Its isolation could lead to a decrease in its support for the Gaza Strip and push Hamas into the open arms of Iran. Although fighting terrorism is in the interests of Israel and the United States, Israel would be wise to advise the US administration not to paint Qatar into the corner, if only because this would push it further towards Iran.

May 01, 2017

Those who hope to see a pragmatic Hamas should be aware it is nowhere near ready to cross the Rubicon, recognize the Quartet conditions or join the peace process. Hamas remains a radical, fundamentalist, Islamic military movement committed to its Muslim Brotherhood roots. A key part of their raison d'être is to bring about a new Islamic caliphate of which the Palestinians are just a part.

Hamas is trying to change its image to ease internal and external pressures, and principally to allow it to take over the PLO. It is also crucial to  remember that the change is being pushed by Hamas’ political wing under Maashal. The political branch today is much weaker than the military wing and Gaza’s political leadership under Sinwar. Any change in the charter is ultimately just hot air given Sinwar still operates under the Hamas military motto, branded on every Hamas announcement: “It is jihad — victory or martyrdom.”

April 16, 2017

Abstract

Donald Trump’s election, together with regional developments, mean the Palestinian ‘internationalization’ strategy has reached a dead end

April 13, 2017

באופן פרדוקסלי, דווקא נוכחותו של יחיא סנוואר, מהקיצונים שבחבורה, כמנהיג בלתי מעורער של חמאס ברצועת עזה ותדמיתו הנוקשה עשויה להתברר כיתרון במידה וישתכנע כי עיצוב מנגנון הסדרה כזה משרת את האינטרסים האסטרטגיים של חמאס. להתחייבויותיו יהיו משקל ומשמעות וסביר להניח שבמידה ויהיה צד להסכם, גם יקפיד לאוכפו. כדי להפוך את סנוואר לחלק משמעותי במשוואה החדשה תזדקק ישראל לשירותי התיווך המצרים ובהמשך לסיוע טורקי, קטרי וסעודי ובהמשך גם של הקהילה הבינלאומית במאמצי השיקום של הרצועה.

April 01, 2017

השפעתה של ישראל על הדינמיקות הפוליטיות בזירה הפלסטינית מוגבלת יחסית. לעומת זאת, חידוש התהליך המדיני והיווצרות מומנטום והישגים מוכחים של הרש"פ, שיבואו לידי ביטוי בשיפור המציאות הכלכלית, בשינוי האווירה ובעיקר בהישגים מדיניים שיתורגמו להתרופפות תחושת הכיבוש, עשויים לרכך את ההשפעה השלילית של הסתלקות אבו מאן מהזירה ולסייע להיווצרותה של הנהגה פלסטינית קולקטיבית, שתוכל להמשיך ולהוביל את הרש"פ במסעה ליעד של הקמת מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית לצד מדינת ישראל על בסיס העיקרון המוסכם של שתי מדינות לאום. הסיכויים לכך אינם גבוהים, אך נדמה שהאלטרנטיבות האחרות גרועות יותר, בהתחשב בהתנגדות פלסטינית עמוקה לרעיונות של ישות פלסטינית שהן פחות ממדינה, שגם אם הן מתאימות יותר למציאות האזורית ולקשיי קיומה של מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית, הרי שאינן עולות בקנה אחד עם השאיפות הלאומיות של הפלסטינים ומכיוון שאין בנמצא מנהיג פלסטיני, שיוכל להוביל מהלך מסוג זה.

Abstract

When the Netanyahu government replaced the Olmert government and Barack Obama assumed the United States presidency, the Palestinians adopted an “internationalization strategy.” This choice reflected the Palestinian skepticism about the possibility of bridging the gaps with Israel and the hope that the international community would accept their tripartite demand: (1) establishment of a Palestinian state (2) on the basis of the 1967 borders (3) with East Jerusalem as its capital. The consolidation of the new administration in the United States, the unease among the Israeli public with the existing situation in the Palestinian context, and the room for maneuver in this context available to the Israeli leadership create a unique opportunity to fashion a new Israeli policy for dealing with the conflict with the Palestinians, and for coordinating this policy with the United States. This strategy should rest on the neutralization of the Palestinian internationalization strategy and incentives to the Palestinians to return to direct negotiations with Israel in order to achieve a settlement on the basis of a two nation-state solution.

Abstract

For many of the Sunni regimes in the Middle East, the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency is a positive development, if only because it marks the end of Barack Obama’s presidency. Obama’s policy was seen as damaging and, in certain cases, treacherous towards those considered traditional American allies. The Gulf states in particular are encouraged by the more assertive tone towards Iran sounded by Trump and Defense Secretary James Mattis, who see Iran as the main source of instability in the region. However, Trump’s presidency also raises concerns: Trump, who has emphasized that his top priority is making America great again and returning it to Americans, could move away from personal involvement in Middle Eastern issues and reduce US overall involvement in the region. American determination could cause the leaders of the pragmatic Arab camp to coordinate and cooperate more closely with Israel against Iran, political Islam, and Salafi jihadism, and place pressure on the Palestinian leadership to resume direct negotiations with Israel to reach an agreement.

February 14, 2017

"בחירתו" של יחיא סינוואר לראשות החמאס ברצועת עזה מתפרשת על ידי רבים כביטוי להתחזקות מעמדו של סינוואר ולהתחזקות הקו המיליטנטי והפרו-איראני של חמאס. אלא שלמעשה, סינוואר הפך למנהיג הבלתי מעורער של חמאס ברצועה מאז שב אליה עם שחרורו מהכלא הישראלי בעקבות עסקת חילופי האסירים הביטחוניים תמורת החייל גלעד שליט.

הדיון הציבורי בסוגיית רכש הצוללות מתמקד בסוגיות הנוגעות לשחיתות שלטונית ומרחיק את הדיון בסוגיות מרכזיות, עקרוניות וחשובות. שוב מוחמצת הזדמנות חשובה לניהול שיח מעמיק בסוגיות הקשורות למהות תפישת הביטחון הלאומי של מדינת ישראל, מהות היחסים בין הדרג הצבאי לבין הדרג המדיני, איכות תשתית הידע שעומדת לרשות מקבלי ההחלטות ותהליכי קבלת ההחלטות בסוגיות של ביטחון לאומי. אין בכך כדי לבטל את הצורך בבחינת ההיבטים העומדים במוקד הדיון הציבורי בימים אלו, אך חשוב שלא להתחמק מהדיון בסוגיות החשובות, ואלו נפקדות מהשיח הציבורי.

Abstract

The election of Donald Trump may well prove to be a strategic opportunity for Israel to improve its relations with the United States and expand coordination with it on all matters pertaining to Israel’s essential strategic interests. Yet despite the strategic opportunity to improve its relations with the United States, excessive enthusiasm and identification with the election of Trump is liable to lead to a series of negative developments. The Israeli leadership should leverage the opportunity that Trump’s victory may provide, but without emotional declarations or exaggerated enthusiasm. Questionable legislation, construction outside the settlement blocs in a manner that can be interpreted as backing those seeking to thwart any possibility of a settlement with the Palestinians, and policy that can be interpreted as support for those striving to weaken particular elite or social circles, the media, and Supreme Court rulings should be avoided.

Abstract

The scope and complexity of the wave of “lone wolf” terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel over the past year do not seem to reflect a single, principal phenomenon. Different actions by individuals have different motivations, although many of the actions share an underlying set of reasons and factors. Israel cannot address all of the fundamental problems motivating “lone wolf” terrorism, but it can moderate some of these factors with the goal of partially addressing the causes of the phenomenon and not just its symptoms. There is great importance in maintaining a low level of friction with the Palestinian civilian population and continuing to refrain from collective punishment. In addition, Israel can make a very significant contribution toward improvement of the economic reality in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority’s strengthened ability to govern. This in turn can enhance the PA’s public support, which has significantly eroded in the past year.

Abstract

In September 2016, an agreement was signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to regulate Palestinian debt payment to the Israel Electric Corporation. This agreement is important for its institutionalizing patterns of cooperation between the Israeli government and the PA during a period when the political process is completely frozen. It demonstrates the potential for cooperation between Israel and the PA, and the ability of professionals from both sides to advance significant collaborations, even while the peace process is frozen. This is a flicker of optimism that must be developed in the process of building the Palestinian state and governing institutions and strengthening the Palestinian economy from the bottom up.

Abstract

On August 17, 2016, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman unveiled his “carrot and stick” plan as a response to the wave of terrorism in the West Bank. The plan rests on four pillars: (a) a distinction between the population involved and the population not involved in terrorism; (b) positive reinforcement for the latter population through infrastructure and economic development and a generous attitude to work permits in Israel; (c) sanctions and restrictions in areas from which terrorists set out and where violent incidents occur; and (d) an appeal to the Palestinian public in the West Bank, which bypasses the Palestinian Authority instead of using the existing coordination channels. This latter element constitutes a direct challenge to the PA and its leadership. However, it is best for the Israeli government to develop the other components of  the “carrot and stick” plan in order to leverage its economic and infrastructure logic, and translate it into a plan of action likely to lead to a positive change, including in the social sphere in the Palestinian arena.

August 22, 2016

ההחלטה להגיב בעוצמה גבוהה יותר ובשני גלים היא איתות ישראלי לחמאס ולארגונים האחרים ברצועה, וכנראה שלא רק להם. הדי תגובת צה"ל כוונו גם לדרום לבנון ולחזית רמת הגולן, תוך הצהרת כוונות על שינוי "כללי המשחק". לא עוד תגובות מינוריות ורפלקסיביות, שתכליתן להבהיר שישראל איננה עוברת לסדר היום על הפרת השקט, ובמקביל נועדות להכיל את האירוע ולרסן אותו כדי למנוע הסלמה.

סקרי דעת קהל שבוצעו מאז תחילת גל הטרור באוקטובר 2015 על ידי מכוני מחקר פלסטיניים (PSR ו-AWRAD) בגדה המערבית וברצועת עזה, משקפים מציאות חברתית ופוליטית מורכבת ודיאלקטית. הדיאלקטיקה באה לידי ביטוי במבוכה; בתסכול; בחוסר אמון בשתי ההנהגות הפלסטיניות (הרשות הפלסטינית וחמאס) ובמערכת הפוליטית הפלסטינית בכללותה; ובירידה בתמיכה בגל הטרור והסכינאות לצד תמיכה בהעצמת ההתנגדות האלימה...

May 15, 2016

The case of Palestine requires an unflinching, honest look at more than two decades of a political process in which the Palestinians have failed to build a functioning state entity. The two Palestinian semi-states in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are experiencing a dangerous process of state failure, and the international community is helpless in stopping it. Without an organized, persistent, painstaking and responsible state-building process in which Israel plays an important part—a process one that insists on addressing the entire gamut of reasons for the current state of affairs in the PA, thereby stopping if not reversing state failure—it seems that there is no real hope for these entities’ development into functioning states, whether on their own or as a single Palestinian state. Furthermore, it is necessary to take a sober look at the regional realities in the wake of various upheavals, which have exposed the complexity and risk inherent in the failing-state phenomenon.

April 18, 2016

“Mr. Sanders has to say that if he will be the president, he will demand that the Palestinians stop playing games and to say once and for all that they accept the formula of two nation-states, change the PLO charter as they are obliged to do, and cut the bullshit.” — Kobi Michael, former Israeli national security official Given presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’ controversial comments about Israel this month, we present a timely Q&A with Kobi Michael. From 2009-13, he served as Deputy Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs (where he also ran the Palestinian desk). Today he is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, a prestigious think tank in Israel. He’s published 12 books and monographs about peacekeeping operations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as more than 50 articles and book chapters on the subjects. We put ten questions to Mr. Michael — but first, here’s a bit of background that may be helpful for Mideast Dig readers.

April 03, 2016

However, the dilemma Israel faces is whether to wait for a Palestinian leadership that deigns to return to the negotiating table without preconditions and abandons its internationalization of the conflict strategy – in other words to sanctify the status quo – or to leverage the attitudes and underlying trends in Palestinian society that can be utilized to transform the highly problematic present. Leveraging these trends could help contain and even check the current wave of terror, laying the foundations for the emergence of a new dynamic, more representative Palestinian leadership, ready to rise to the challenge of new initiatives that could improve the quality of life in the PA territories. This, in turn, could raise the level of support for the political process and strengthen the PA, which does not enjoy wide legitimacy and is currently finding it difficult to function effectively.

February 15, 2016

Israel needs to recognize that the old order no longer exists and it must prepare for a new and very different reality

Dr. Michael Kobi, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. Dr. Kobi served as the deputy director general and head of the Palestinian desk at the Ministry for Strategic Affairs.
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Israeli military has started deploying hundreds of troops in cities amid the recent surge of violent attacks in the country.

Six companies will be deployed to assist local police forces, media reports suggest.

Earlier, Israeli Cabinet authorized police to seal off certain areas of Jerusalem to halt the wave of deadly attacks around the city.

That’s according to an official statement released after Tuesday’s emergency meeting.

The paper also stated that soldiers would be deployed in several cities to patrol streets and help local police.

The Cabinet’s decision came a day after three Israeli nationals were killed and several more injured in shooting and stabbing attacks.

Police identified attackers as Palestinians, confirming that some of them were shot dead.

Following the attacks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the country was preparing a set of counter-terrorism measures.

He underlined that the governments would undertake all steps necessary to restore peace.

Tensions between Israel and Palestine have soared since last month, following clashes at al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

The attacks along with violent protests has raised fears that a full-scale Palestinian uprising, or so-called third intifada, could erupt.

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Abstract

The current escalation in Jerusalem, particularly on the Temple Mount, requires the design of an overall strategy, not a tactic of merely putting out fires as they occur. The general strategy should facilitate a complex balance between efforts to stabilize the situation and efforts to fashion creative solutions. The stabilization efforts should include stepped up police presence and law enforcement, along with legislative changes to enact more severe punishment. These should be combined with efforts to temper the behavior of Jewish provocateurs, and diplomatic and public relations efforts to expose the true nature of the events on the Temple Mount to the international community, with an emphasis on the riots and violent confrontations aroused by Palestinian groups. Concurrently, Israel should try to refashion the existing situation on the Temple Mount, with a focus on excluding inciters, headed by Hamas and the northern faction of the Islamic Movement, while reinforcing the presence and influence of the Jordanian Waqf on the site.

Abstract

In addition to its direct implications for the nuclear realm, the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program creates a host of other challenges for Israel. These challenges concern primarily the Palestinian and Syrian arenas, the delegitimization arena, and Israel’s special relationship with the United States, including its standing vis-à-vis the administration and the battle for US public opinion. • The US drive to sign an agreement with Iran reflects a strategic choice based on the premise that Iran is part of the solution to the problems in the Middle East, and not part of the problem. Iran appears to be regarded by the US administration as a stabilizing force and a responsible actor that can be relied upon in the struggle against fundamentalist Islam in general and the Islamic State in particular. On a practical level, this view bespeaks US acceptance of Iran’s hegemonic aspirations and effort to expand its influence in the region.

Abstract

The double game is a tool used by actors in the Palestinian arena allowing vacillation on the pragmatism-ideology axis. However, this double game could result in the loss of control of the situation. In order to reduce that risk, Israel would do well to adopt an integrated policy. Vis-à-vis the PA, Israel must avoid canceling the relief measures it has granted toward better daily life in the West Bank, and strengthen security coordination with the PA. At the same time, it must act decisively in the international arena against the PA’s confrontational policy and reveal the PA’s true colors, emphasizing the latter’s policy on undermining Gaza reconstruction efforts and its incitement to violence and encouragement of radicalism. When it comes to Hamas, Israel must avoid cooperating with the organization’s double game in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, treat Hamas as a unified entity, be it in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, and prevent it from establishing the rules of the game to suit itself.

The world has seemed stunned by the recent wave of global terrorism linked to the Islamic State group and the various terrorist organizations affiliated with it. But a closer look at the group's operational strategy leaves little to wonder about. Imbued with Islamist-jihadi-Salafist ideology, Islamic State's logic is network-based, operating on multiple fronts simultaneously....

Abstract

The ongoing humanitarian distress in the Gaza Strip may spark processes of escalation and deterioration that result in another round of conflict between Hamas and Israel. Clearly, therefore, Israel has an interest in hastening the reconstruction of Gaza, but Israel will not be able to lead the reconstruction project by itself. Moving the project forward requires the PA’s involvement, and Egyptian support is also necessary, joined by a leading role for Saudi Arabia and the involvement of other countries in the region. This amounts to a regional plan, which Israel may be able to encourage by showing willingness to reconsider the Arab Peace Initiative, with necessary adjustments, and perhaps also by offering a gesture to the PA in matters pertaining to daily life in the West Bank. In addition, the international community must be actively involved in the reconstruction effort. The Quartet may be able to formulate a conceptual and operational framework acceptable to all the parties involved, and encourage them to take responsibility for what happens in the Gaza Strip.

The grim humanitarian reality in Gaza is double-edged: The dire living conditions the Palestinians suffer pose a strategic threat to Israel. Continuing stalemate means greater likelihood of another round of violence with a higher price tag for both sides. Paradoxically, Israel and Hamas share a common interest. Both, for different reasons, want to facilitate the reconstruction...

January 01, 2020

ב-30 במאי 2016 צפויה להתקיים בפאריס פגישה של שרי חוץ ונציגי הליגה הערבית ובכללם נציגי הקוורטט לצורך הכנה של ועידה בינלאומית, הצפויה להתכנס מספר חודשים מאוחר יותר, במטרה לחדש את התהליך המדיני בין ישראל לפלסטינים. בפגישה הצפויה להתקיים, לא ישתתפו נציגי ישראל והפלסטינים. ככל הידוע, הצרפתים ביטלו את התניית הזמן המוקצב למשא ומתן והתחייבות צרפתית להכיר במדינה פלסטינית במידה והמשא...

This month will mark 13 years in the life of the Arab initiative, which was presented during the Arab League summit in Beirut in 2002, ratified five years later (in 2007), and in 2014, with more amendments or corrections by a senior Kuwaiti official that visited United States. But these amendments (regard to accepting the principle of territorial exchanges) were not officially...

ב-6 בפברואר 2016 פרסם המכון הערבי למחקר ופיתוח (Arab World for Research & Development) סקר דעת קהל מקיף ובו הוצגו עמדות הציבור הפלסטיני ברצועת עזה ובגדה המערבית בנוגע להשפעת גל הטרור על חייהם, הערכת תפקוד המוסדות הפוליטיים, עתידה של הרשות הפלסטינית ועוד נושאים. ממצאי הסקר המקיף חושפים מגמות מעניינות בהלך הרוח של הציבור הפלסטיני הרחב בכלל ובהשוואה לסקרים קודמים של אותו...

Abstract

Recent weeks have been marked by terrorist attacks and rioting in Jerusalem and the West Bank; rocket fire from the Gaza Strip; and protests by Israeli Arabs. Many observers and politicians have been quick to affix the familiar label of “intifada” to the current wave of violence. Calling the escalation a “third intifada,” however, is not an accurate portrayal of the current events, and therefore does not invite the right response to the situation. At this stage, there is no intifada according to its recognized meaning, but the current escalation, accompanied by the disintegration of the institutional order in the PA, contains the seeds of decline and loss of control. It therefore requires an Israeli response that is both direct and indirect, immediate and for the longer term, and public and behind-the-scenes. At the same time, the Israeli government should avoid misleading the Israeli public about its ability to put a complete end to terrorism. With all the difficulty involved, the Israeli public must understand the reality of conflict management in a situation such as the current one, in which Palestinian violence draws its inspiration from religion and the regional upheaval.

בימים אלו מצביע לוח השנה על חמש שנות טלטלה של המרחב הערבי במזרח התיכון. מה שהתחיל כתקווה גדולה לשינוי, מה שנדמה היה בעיני רבים כתחילתו של "אביב עמים" חדש ומה שכמעט והצליח לתקף את תזת פרנסיס פוקויאמה בנוגע ל"קץ ההיסטוריה", במובן של קריסת האידאולוגיות הדכאניות והתבססות הגמונית של הליברליזם הדמוקרטי, הפך לאימת הסדר האזורי והעולמי החדש. קץ ההיסטוריה התחלף ב"התנגשות הציביליזציות"...

הציבור בישראל נוטה לפרש את האלימות והטרור הפלסטיניים בחודשים האחרונים כהתקוממות נוספת נגד ישראל הנובעת מהסתה מתמשכת ומחוסר נכונות להשלים עם מדינת לאום יהודית במרחב. בעיני רבים בישראל, גל הטרור הנוכחי הוא עוד גל בשורה של רבים אחרים בסכסוך המתמשך מזה מאה שנות ציונות ויותר. יש להבין כי הסבר זה חלקי בלבד.

Abstract

Faced with the ongoing reality of stabbings, vehicle attacks, and shootings, many in Israel are demanding that much more be done to deal with the situation. In this context, they repeatedly invoke the old, familiar toolbox that was effective during the second intifada, when Israel faced organized terrorism. However, the current outbreak does not resemble the second intifada. In recent years, Israel has failed to outfit a new toolbox suited to the spirit of the times focused on economic, infrastructural, social, educational, and public relations efforts, to be used also in the new media. The reality of the last few years has suppressed the development of a legitimate local Palestinian leadership that is attentive to the population’s problems, and represents an outlet for dialogue with Israel and a means to rein in violence. Lacking an appropriate solution to a strategic problem, there is a return to the old tool box; some in Israel are pushing to recycle operational plans formulated as a response to a radically different situation. This could well prove to be a bad mistake. The pressure on the political echelon and the security establishment to act is liable to impair the political echelon’s rational considerations, undermine the restrained and responsible reaction taken to date, and lead to it adopt a rationale of action that is unsuited to the current type of terrorism.

המדינה האיסלאמית (דאעש) הופכת לתופעה, המעצבת תודעת איום מתפשט בשלושה מעגלים :המקומי, האזורי והבינלאומי. ברמה המקומית, היא נתפשת כאיום קיומי עבור תושבי צפון סוריה, בעיקר בני המיעוט הכורדי, ועבור תושבי האזורים בצפון מזרח עיראק. ברמה האזורית, אנו עדים להצטרפות ארגוני ג'יהאד לארגון האם, שלו נשבעו אמונים. ואילו ברמה הבינלאומית, אנו נחשפים להתרחבות תופעת המתנדבים ממדינות שונות...

הניסיון למסגר את האירועים ולשרטט פרופיל של המפגעים הבודדים, מחייב צניעות והסתייגות, ולו מכיוון שאנו עוסקים בתופעה בהתהוות. התוצאה היא גל טרור ואלימות, המתרחש בארבע זירות מקבילות: ירושלים, הגדה המערבית, רצועת עזה ופנים ישראל. המשותף לארבעתן הוא המפגע הפלסטיני ודפוסי הפעולה, המאופיינים בטרור, אלימות, הפרות סדר ומאמץ מכוון לחיכוך עם גורמי הביטחון. אלא שכל אחת מהזירות מתאפיינת...

ארבע שנות טלטלה ערבית עיצבו מציאות גיאו־אסטרטגית חדשה במזרח התיכון ומעבר לו. התפוררות הסדר האזורי והתחזקות מדאיגה של שחקנים לא־מדינתיים בדמות ארגוני טרור איסלאמיים קיצוניים ואלימים, המבקשים לכונן סדר אזורי ועולמי חדש הנשען על האיסלאם ועל השריעה, הן קריאת השכמה, אולי אחרונה, לעולם החופשי.

המעצר המינהלי לא נולד יש מאין. הכלי המשפטי הזה נוצר לצורך התמודדות עם מקרים חריגים וחמורים במיוחד, שבהם ברור מעבר לכל צל של ספק כי אם מי שמוגדר כפעיל טרור לא ייעצר ויושם במשמורת, ייפגעו אזרחים חפים מפשע. אלא שעל התנאי הזה, מוסיפה החקיקה תנאי נוסף והוא ודאות גבוהה לגבי הפגיעה ביכולות מודיעיניות רגישות, במקרה שהרשויות יבקשו לעצור את פעיל הטרור שלא במסגרת מעצר מינהלי, מה שמוביל..

העולם נדמה כמוכה תדהמה מאירועי הטרור האחרונים המשויכים לדאעש ולתומכיו. אלא שבחינה עקבית של הארגון ואסטרטגיית הפעולה המנחה אותו אינן צריכות לעורר תמיהה. הארגון חדור האידיאולוגיה האיסלאמית הסלפיסטית־ג'יהאדיסטית, אשר נשען על מתווה ועל היגיון פעולה רשתיים, פועל בחזיתות רבות במקביל ובשיטות אלימות ורצחניות במיוחד. פעולות אלו מלוות באסטרטגיה תקשורתית יעילה, המתבססת על שימוש יעיל...

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בעוד זמן קצר תמלא שנה למבצע צוק איתן ונדמה כי לפחות חלק מהציבור הישראלי מגלה סימני ייאוש מתוצאות המבצע. "טפטופי" הרקטות הופכים לסוג של זרזיף, גשם קל, מין חשרת עננים המבשרת התלקחות מחודשת באזור, כאילו מדובר היה בגזירת גורל, שאין להימלט מפניה. אך מבט מפוקח ומעמיק יותר בתמונת המציאות העזתית והאזורית עשוי לחשוף מציאות אחרת. במציאות הזו, המאופיינת בכאוטיות פרדוקסאלית, בה אויבים...

בימים האחרונים השלימה דאעש את השתלטותה על העיר החשובה רמאצ'י בעיראק והשתלטה על מחנות ומחסנים של הצבא העיראקי, שניגף בפניה. על פניו מדובר בהישג צבאי ותודעתי מרשים, העשוי להפיח רוח של עידוד במפרשי הישות הסמי־מדינתית, הנאלצת להתמודד עם מאמצי כתישה אווירית של כוחות ה"קואליציה" בהובלת ארה"ב.  אלא שלצד תודעת ההישג מסתמנת האפשרות שדאעש עלולה למצוא עצמה במצב שבו עברה את "שיא ההצלחה"

יש בשכנינו הנוטים להתרשם מעומק הפילוג והשסעים הפוליטיים והחברתיים כאן ומסיקים מכך על חולשת המערכת הפוליטית, ומכאן על חולשת החברה ומדינת ישראל. יש בהם המביטים בפליאה, ואולי אפילו בקנאה מסוימת, בישראל ומייחלים לתהליכים דמוקרטיים תוססים כאלו במדינותיהם. יש מי שמייחלים לתוצאות מסוימות בתקווה שיהיה בהן כדי לקדם את האינטרסים החשובים להם (בעיקר הפלשתינים). ולבסוף, יש אלו הטרודים כל כך בהישרדותם ובאתגרים מבית, שמידת הקשב שלהם למתרחש כאן נמוכה ממילא.

נדמה כי אם יש משהו מן המשותף לכל אלו, הוא הקושי בהבנת הדיאלקטיקה של המציאות החברתית-פוליטית בישראל, הסתירה המובנית שמסתתרת לה בין שסעים חברתיים, פוליטיים, דתיים ולאומיים לבין חוסן חברתי ועוצמה לאומית. גם לישראלים לא מעטים קשה להכיל את המורכבות שבסתירה זו ויש בנו הנוטים לפרש התלהמות ודברי בלע גזעניים של ימי בחירות (שאותם בכל מקרה יש לגנות, ובחריפות) כביטוי לשבר העצום ולחולשתה של ישראל כחברה וכמדינה. ואם בנו יש כאלו, אין להתפלא שרבים עוד יותר, המסיקים מסקנה דומה, נמצאים בקרב שכנינו הערבים.

Abstract

Israel would do well to announce that it regards the Arab Peace Initiative as a basis for negotiations, in which principles for a regional agreement resting on a regional security regime are formulated, with the Palestinian issue being a layer or element in the broad regional system – not an issue by itself. Israel should seek to make the Arab initiative, after negotiations between the parties and necessary adjustments, into a kind of new systemic logic, which inter alia will require the Arab world to accept significant responsibility for the Palestinian issue. The agreed-upon Arab initiative is likely to have positive strategic significance if it motivates the pragmatic Arab countries, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, to make the Palestinian issue a “controlled” element in the new, emerging regional system. In other words, they will take upon themselves responsibility for preventing Palestinian violations or abandonment of the emerging settlement.

Abstract

Operation Protective Edge ended in August 2014, leaving the Gaza Strip entrenched in a complex humanitarian reality. The international community committed itself to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, and at a conference in Cairo close to the end of the military operation some $5.4 billion was promised. However, for several reasons the project has not yet commenced and the Gaza Strip is now a powder keg: hence the need for a creative solution that would bridge the respective gaps, positions, and demands, and improve the likelihood of starting the reconstruction project while ensuring effective supervision of the use of reconstruction funds and materials. In 1951, during the Korean War, the idea of “sanctuaries” was developed: certain zones were defined as off limits to combat, even during battles between the sides. This idea could be adopted for the good of Gaza Strip reconstruction, with specific areas defined as neutral, protected zones.

לו רק הייתי יכול להיות זבוב בלשכתם של אבו מאזן, הנשיא א־סיסי, מלך סעודיה ואפילו בשאר אסד, לצפות בהבעת פניהם, להסכית למוצא פיהם, ובעיקר להקשיב לאנחתם לנוכח נאום נתניהו - בין שמפאת ייאוש ובין שמפאת התפעלות. אוכל להניח כי כל אלה יחד מבינים ומפנימים כי את גודל המעמד ואיכות המחזה לא יוכל לשחזר או לשכפל מי מהם. יותר מכל תובנותיהם מהנאום אתמול, מעריך אני כי חשובה ביותר היא הבנתם את...

Abstract

This article examines three options for Israel regarding the reconstruction of Gaza. None of these options are optimal for Israel, as they do not guarantee a long term lull in hostilities – although two have the advantage of including a political initiative, which could extricate Israel from its international isolation and facilitate a breakthrough in the political deadlock. Nonetheless, it seems that at this stage, the option of Israeli efforts to help rebuild the Gaza Strip and improve the living conditions of the population is the most aligned with Israeli interests. This analysis draws on an assessment of the Israeli leadership and the slim prospect of a successful resumption of the negotiations with the PA under Abbas; certainly this is the case over the next six months, while the Israeli elections maintain the political deadlock. However, there is tension in this option between the need to rein in Hamas and the fact that the Israeli assistance will lead to a strengthening of Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip and the rehabilitation of its legitimacy. In addition, this result is not consistent with Egypt's interests, and it can weaken the PA.

Abstract

The use of the phrase “the third intifada” is gaining ground, even though the recent car attacks and stabbings were carried out by individual terrorists on their own initiative. While certainly affected by the tense atmosphere in Jerusalem, they did not carry them out as organizational operatives or in the name of any particular group. At the same time, it seems that use of the word “intifada” helps categorize the events, ascribing a certain logic to them and making them easier to understand. However, it is important to stress the negative effect this rhetoric is liable to have on the consciousness of Palestinians and Israelis alike. There is therefore a danger that frequent use of the loaded word could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Islamic State group has become a phenomenon with ripple effects that are felt in three circles: local, regional and international. On the local level, Islamic State is an existential threat to the residents of northern Syria, specifically the Kurdish minority, as well as regions in north-eastern Iraq. 

Abstract

Given that the Palestinian leadership is still formally committed to the Oslo Agreements and it repeatedly declares its sincere intention of reaching a peace agreement with Israel, it must explain the meaning of its demand for recognition of the right to Palestinian self-determination alongside its resolute denial of the same right for the Jewish people and the State of Israel. It will be difficult to counter the argument of those who regard the Palestinian refusal to recognize the right to self-determination of the Jewish people as a manifestation of a lack of the readiness and the maturity required to conclude a true peace treaty, or, in other words, as a sophisticated, toned-down formulation of the "strategy of phases" and the historical yearning for the destruction of the Jewish national entity in the western land of Israel.   

Abstract

In the current Middle East reality, the foundation for strategic interests common to the area’s so-called pragmatic nations, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, has grown. These interests are also shared by Israel. The Arab Peace Initiative could emerge as a conceptual and operational basis for realizing two shared strategic interests: weakening Hamas and foiling the threat posed by ISIS. As such, a regional coalition based on shared strategic interests can be formed on the basis of the seminal idea behind the Arab Peace Initiative to help lay the foundation for a regional security regime based on intelligence and military cooperation. This regional coalition could remain relevant even after the establishment of the Palestinian state and continue to be the foundation for coordinated action against common challenges.

Abstract

The economic reality in the Gaza Strip, which was in a state of crisis long before Operation Protective Edge, has deteriorated even further. Israel has an interest in working for the rapid reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, even though the image of an unrealized military achievement discourages Israel from enlisting in the reconstruction process, which will be seen as a strategic achievement for Hamas. Basic reconstruction of the Gaza Strip is also a vital element for the Palestinian state building process, and is an important lever for strengthening the Palestinian Authority and renewing the peace process. At the same time, it is also a fundamental test of the PA’s willingness, resolve, and executive ability. Problematic or inadequate performance by the PA in the Gaza Strip would be a warning as to the functional capabilities of the PA in state governance in the West Bank once an agreement is signed.

Abstract

Qatar’s support for Hamas and the vehement opposition by Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to the US attempt to let Qatar play a role in the efforts to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip have stirred the debate about Qatar’s conduct in the regional and international arenas. Through its policies in recent years, particularly its support for Muslim extremists in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, alongside overt support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Qatar has unsettled other regional players and threatened their vital interests. But the emirate’s power is not unlimited. United forces and a smart combination of overt and covert action can highlight the determination of the moderate camp to foil Qatar’s dangerous influence. This will help undermine the self-confidence of the Qatari royal family and prompt it to rethink the cost-benefit ratio of support for radical elements, in order to reduce the country’s negative effect on the region’s security and stability.

לאחר שלושה שבועות של לחימה נקלע חמאס למשבר אסטרטגי שיכול להוביל בסופו של תהליך גם להדחתו מהשלטון בעזה. אם הדבר עונה על השאיפות של ישראל, עליה להמשיך ללחוץ עליו.

Abstract

The abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers has returned the issue of Palestinian terror and the military threat from the Gaza Strip to the top of the public agenda. As a result, there is a strong demand to change Israel’s strategic approach to Hamas and to terror and violence in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The government of Israel has leveraged the kidnapping in order to make it clear to the Israeli public and the international community that Hamas is a terrorist organization and that there should be no tolerance of a hybrid organization that plays on two fields, one political and the other terror-based, and that has an independent military terrorist wing.

Abstract

Several factors are at the base of the military success of ISIS and other jihadist organizations: the structural and functional weaknesses of Arab nation states; the organizations’ networked and decentralized structure, which makes it easier for them to operate and sustain themselves in the region; the ineffectiveness of the international community, first and foremost the United States, stemming from the lack of a solution to the problem and an unwillingness to become militarily involved; and the erosion of the United States’ image as a superpower and its ability to resolve regional problems.

Abstract

A paradigm shift in the Israeli-Palestinian discourse, which will enable a more developed foundation for advanced negotiations toward a future agreement, is now necessary. Specifically, the discourse must shift from national rights to human rights, focusing on the humanitarian rights of the Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian Authority. Israel, with the backing of the United States and the international community, should launch a process built on the humanitarian drive to bring relief to the refugee population in the PA and transfer this obligation to the Palestinian  government, which would receive aid from Israel and the international community for the effort.

Abstract

The reconciliation agreement reached recently by Fatah and Hamas is a result of the internal weakness of both organizations, with each suffering a steady erosion of legitimacy and public support. The government of technocrats to be formed is a mechanism meant to make a show of both sides living under the same roof without either one having to give up its fundamental ideology. Should a Palestinian unity government of technocrats be established, one option open to Israel is a transition from a discourse of opposition to the reconciliation, to an attempt to restart the political process but with an essential difference in the format of the process. This would entail moving away from a discussion of the permanent status agreement core issues, where the gaps cannot be bridged any time soon, to a gradual construction of a two-state reality by helping the Palestinians build a responsible, stable, and functioning political entity.

Abstract

In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to have the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley. Secretary Kerry apparently presumes that Israel’s concerns about security issues are the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel’s concerns are met, further progress on the political process toward an agreement will be possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately. In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a combination of four elements: the military element; the element of Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the element of international legitimacy.

July 03, 2006

Abstract

Essentially, the document is as significant for what it does not say as for it says. Specifically, it does not explicitly recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist; In fact, Israel is not mentioned once in the entire document. The reader can only infer about an implicit recognition based on the call for an independent Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967."